Kant's defense of common moral experience a phenomenological account / Jeanine Grenberg.

Includes bibliographical references.

Acknowledgements; Getting Kant's joke: a phenomenological defenseof common moral experience; The common moral philosopher: admonishing the experts; The development of the practical problem; Reassertion of the common point of view; Chapter summary; Part I The interpretive framework; 1 Kant's common, phenomenological grounding of morality; Introduction; First-personal phenomenological experience; Common experience; Felt experience; Attention to felt experience; The attentive moral philosopher; 2 Response to immediate objections: experience; Introduction

I. Different ways of appealing to experienceIntroduction; Two ways of appealing to experience; II. A new kind of experience: phenomenological, not empirical; III. New ways of appealing to experience: wonder and attentiveness; Introduction; The moral law as an object of wonder; Attending to our moral experiences; Conclusion; 3 Response to immediate objections: feeling; Introduction; I. The a priority of a common moral feeling; A special, a priori feeling; Moral feeling as common; II. The rejection of moral sense theory; Moral sense theory revisited

Kant's use of feeling to affirm the practicality of pure reasonConclusion; Part II The Groundwork; 4 Kant's Groundwork rejection of a reliable experience of categorical obligation; Introduction; I. Kant's Groundwork appeal to the common; The practically wise common person; The fall of the common person; II. Critical analysis; Introduction; Common human experience as first-personal, felt, phenomenological experience; Two competing models of common-philosophical interaction; Problems in the common-philosophical relationship; III. Why Kant rejects a reliable experience of categorical obligation

IntroductionGroundwork II arguments; Other reasons?; Conclusion; 5 The phenomenological failure of Groundwork III; Introduction; I. The phenomenological argument of Groundwork III; The felt phenomenological experience of freedom; From freedom to morality; The argument from freedom to morality; II. Analysis of the argument, part one: a successful introduction of felt phenomenological experience; Felt phenomenological experience in Groundwork III; The practical nature of Kant's grounding premise; The commonness and reliability of the felt experience

III. Analysis of the argument, part two: the failure of Groundwork IIIIntroduction; The inadequacy of negative freedom; A failed effort at attentiveness; Failure of the movement from freedom to morality; Any hindsight saving of this argument?; Conclusion; Part III The Critique of Practical Reason; 6 Recent interpretations of the Fact of Reason; Introduction; I. Allison's reading of the Fact of Reason; II. Fichtean, first-personal readings of the Fact of Reason; 7 The Gallows Man: the new face of attentiveness; Introduction; I. New confidence in an old, common, felt experience

The Gallows Man as a common, felt, first-personal phenomenological experience

Argues that everything important about Kant's moral philosophy emerges from common human experience of the conflict between happiness and morality.

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