How to prevent coups d'état : counterbalancing and regime survival / Erica De Bruin.
Material type: TextPublication details: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, (c)2020.Description: 1 online resource (xiv, 199 pages) : illustrations, mapsContent type:- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9781501751929
- 9781501751936
- JC494 .H698 2020
- COPYRIGHT NOT covered - Click this link to request copyright permission: https://lib.ciu.edu/copyright-request-form
Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | URL | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Online Book (LOGIN USING YOUR MY CIU LOGIN AND PASSWORD) | G. Allen Fleece Library ONLINE | Non-fiction | JC494 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Link to resource | Available | on1140380459 |
Includes bibliographies and index.
Introduction: Preventing Coups d'état -- The Logic of Counterbalancing -- Counterbalancing and Coup Failure -- How Counterbalancing Works: Testing the Causal Mechanisms -- An Effective Deterrent? Counterbalancing and Coup Attempts -- Challenges to Building Coercive Institutions -- How Coups d'état Escalate to Civil War -- Conclusion: Coercive Institutions and Regime Survival.
"In this book Erica De Bruin shows that how rulers design and organize their coercive institutions affects the survival of their regimes. Balancing the military with republican guards, secret police, and militia makes attempts to oust rulers more likely to fail. However, counterbalancing carries risks. When forces outside the regular military chain of command compete for arms and recruits, resentment among military officers can provoke coup attempts even as counterbalancing creates obstacles to a coup's execution."--
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