How to prevent coups d'état : counterbalancing and regime survival /
De Bruin, Erica, 1982-
How to prevent coups d'état : counterbalancing and regime survival / Erica De Bruin. - Ithaca : Cornell University Press, (c)2020. - 1 online resource (xiv, 199 pages) : illustrations, maps
Includes bibliographies and index.
Introduction: Preventing Coups d'état -- The Logic of Counterbalancing -- Counterbalancing and Coup Failure -- How Counterbalancing Works: Testing the Causal Mechanisms -- An Effective Deterrent? Counterbalancing and Coup Attempts -- Challenges to Building Coercive Institutions -- How Coups d'état Escalate to Civil War -- Conclusion: Coercive Institutions and Regime Survival.
"In this book Erica De Bruin shows that how rulers design and organize their coercive institutions affects the survival of their regimes. Balancing the military with republican guards, secret police, and militia makes attempts to oust rulers more likely to fail. However, counterbalancing carries risks. When forces outside the regular military chain of command compete for arms and recruits, resentment among military officers can provoke coup attempts even as counterbalancing creates obstacles to a coup's execution."--
9781501751929 9781501751936
2020005768
Coups d'état--Prevention.
Civil war--Prevention.
Balance of power.
Political leadership.
Political stability.
Military policy.
Civil-military relations.
National security.
Electronic Books.
JC494 / .H698 2020
How to prevent coups d'état : counterbalancing and regime survival / Erica De Bruin. - Ithaca : Cornell University Press, (c)2020. - 1 online resource (xiv, 199 pages) : illustrations, maps
Includes bibliographies and index.
Introduction: Preventing Coups d'état -- The Logic of Counterbalancing -- Counterbalancing and Coup Failure -- How Counterbalancing Works: Testing the Causal Mechanisms -- An Effective Deterrent? Counterbalancing and Coup Attempts -- Challenges to Building Coercive Institutions -- How Coups d'état Escalate to Civil War -- Conclusion: Coercive Institutions and Regime Survival.
"In this book Erica De Bruin shows that how rulers design and organize their coercive institutions affects the survival of their regimes. Balancing the military with republican guards, secret police, and militia makes attempts to oust rulers more likely to fail. However, counterbalancing carries risks. When forces outside the regular military chain of command compete for arms and recruits, resentment among military officers can provoke coup attempts even as counterbalancing creates obstacles to a coup's execution."--
9781501751929 9781501751936
2020005768
Coups d'état--Prevention.
Civil war--Prevention.
Balance of power.
Political leadership.
Political stability.
Military policy.
Civil-military relations.
National security.
Electronic Books.
JC494 / .H698 2020