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Radicalizing enactivism : basic minds without content / Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublication details: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, (c)2013.Description: 1 online resourceContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780262312172
  • 9781283906401
Subject(s): Genre/Form: LOC classification:
  • BF311 .R335 2013
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
Contents:
Enactivisms less radical -- The reach of REC -- The hard problem of content -- CIC's retreat -- CIC's last stand -- Extensive minds -- Regaining consciousness.
Summary: Hutto and Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition which holds that some kinds of minds - basic minds - are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. It opposes the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. The authors defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness.
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Holdings
Item type Current library Collection Call number URL Status Date due Barcode
Online Book (LOGIN USING YOUR MY CIU LOGIN AND PASSWORD) Online Book (LOGIN USING YOUR MY CIU LOGIN AND PASSWORD) G. Allen Fleece Library ONLINE Non-fiction BF311 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Link to resource Available ocn822894365

Includes bibliographies and index.

Hutto and Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition which holds that some kinds of minds - basic minds - are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. It opposes the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. The authors defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness.

Enactivism : the radical line -- Enactivisms less radical -- The reach of REC -- The hard problem of content -- CIC's retreat -- CIC's last stand -- Extensive minds -- Regaining consciousness.

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