Radicalizing enactivism : basic minds without content /
Hutto, Daniel D.
Radicalizing enactivism : basic minds without content / Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. - Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, (c)2013. - 1 online resource
Includes bibliographies and index.
Enactivism : the radical line -- Enactivisms less radical -- The reach of REC -- The hard problem of content -- CIC's retreat -- CIC's last stand -- Extensive minds -- Regaining consciousness.
Hutto and Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition which holds that some kinds of minds - basic minds - are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. It opposes the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. The authors defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness.
9780262312172 9781283906401
Cognition--Philosophy.
Philosophy and cognitive science.
Philosophy of mind.
Cognitive science.
Content (Psychology)
Cognition.
Cognition
Cognitive Science
Social Sciences.
Psychology.
PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General
Electronic Books.
BF311 / .R335 2013
Radicalizing enactivism : basic minds without content / Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. - Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, (c)2013. - 1 online resource
Includes bibliographies and index.
Enactivism : the radical line -- Enactivisms less radical -- The reach of REC -- The hard problem of content -- CIC's retreat -- CIC's last stand -- Extensive minds -- Regaining consciousness.
Hutto and Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition which holds that some kinds of minds - basic minds - are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. It opposes the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. The authors defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness.
9780262312172 9781283906401
Cognition--Philosophy.
Philosophy and cognitive science.
Philosophy of mind.
Cognitive science.
Content (Psychology)
Cognition.
Cognition
Cognitive Science
Social Sciences.
Psychology.
PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General
Electronic Books.
BF311 / .R335 2013