000			03110nam a2200361Ki 4500
001			ocn852158119
003			OCoLC
005			20240726105341.0
008			130708s2013 enka ob 001 0 eng d
040			_aNT _beng _erda _cNT
020			_a9781107341807 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)l((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)ctronic bk.
043			_acl-----
050	0	4	_aJL966 _b.M355 2013
049			_aNTA
100	1		_aNegretto, Gabriel L., _e1
245	1	0	_aMaking constitutions _bpresidents, parties, and institutional choice in Latin America / _cGabriel L. Negretto.
260			_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c(c)2013.
300			_a1 online resource (283 pages) : _billustrations.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_adata file _2rda
504			_a2
520	0		_a"Negretto provides the first systematic explanation of the origins of constitutional designs from an analytical, historical and comparative perspective. Based on analysis of constitutional change in Latin America from 1900 to 2008 and four detailed case studies, Negretto shows the main determinants of constitutional choice are the past performance of constitutions in providing effective and legitimate instruments of government and the strategic interests of the actors who have influence over institutional selection. The book explains how governance problems shape the general guidelines for reform, while strategic calculations and power resources affect the selection of specific alternatives of design. It emphasizes the importance of events that trigger reform and the designers' level of electoral uncertainty for understanding the relative impact of short-term partisan interests on constitution writing. Negretto's study challenges predominant theories of institutional choice and paves the way for the development of a new research agenda on institutional change"-- _cProvided by publisher.
505	0	0	_aMachine generated contents note: Part I. The Logic of Constitutional Choice: Theory and Data: 1. Constitutional change and patterns of design; 2. A two-level theory of constitutional choice; 3. Determinants of variation in constitutional choice; Part II. Case Studies: The Origins of Reforms: 4. Constitutional change as a means to consolidate power: Argentina 1949; 5. Constitutional change as a strategy to redistribute power: Argentina 1994; 6. Constitutional change as a response to state failure: Colombia 1991; 7. Constitutional change as a remedy for ungovernability: Ecuador 1998.
530			_a2 _ub
650		0	_aRepresentative government and representation _zLatin America _xHistory _y20th century.
655		1	_aElectronic Books.
856	4	0	_uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=545028&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518 _zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password
942			_cOB _D _eEB _hJL _m2013 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC
994			_a02 _bNT
999			_c97491 _d97491
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell