000			03088cam a2200373 i 4500
001			on1227836083
003			OCoLC
005			20240726105149.0
008			201118s2021 nyu ob 001 0 eng
010			_a2020052485
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _cDLC _dOCLCO _dEBLCP _dNT _dUKAHL _dOCLCF _dYDX _dOCLCO _dJSTOR
020			_a9780231552516 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)
042			_apcc
043			_an-us--- _aa-cc---
050	0	4	_aE183 _b.I865 2021
049			_aMAIN
100	1		_aWang, Tao _c(Diplomatic historian), _e1
245	1	0	_aIsolating the Enemy : _bDiplomatic Strategy in China and the United States, 1953-1956 / _cTao Wang.
246	3	0	_aDiplomatic Strategy in China and the United States, 1953-1956
300			_a1 online resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_adata file _2rda
490	1		_aStudies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
504			_a2
520	0		_a"In the crucial moment after the Korean War, the United States and the People's Republic of China circled each other warily. They shifted between confrontation and conciliation, ratcheting up tension yet also embarking on peace initiatives. Tao Wang offers a new account of Sino-American relations in the mid-1950s that situates the two great powers in their international context. He reveals how both the United States and China adopted a policy of attempting to isolate their adversary and explores how Chinese and American leaders perceived and reacted to each other's strategies. Although the policy of the Eisenhower administration was to contain China, Washington often overestimated Chinese aggressiveness, worrying allies and neutral states. Sensitive to the differences within the Western camp, Chinese leaders sought to convince American allies to persuade the United States to back down. Wang analyzes diplomatic maneuvering over a peace settlement in Indochina, an American defense pact with Taiwan, and the anticolonial Bandung Conference, showing how political pressure pushed American leaders to make concessions. He challenges the portrayal of Communist states as driven by ideology, showing that Chinese leaders adopted a pragmatic policy during these crucial years. Drawing on Chinese, Taiwanese, Russian, Vietnamese, British, and American archival material, including reclassified Chinese Foreign Ministry documents, Isolating the Enemy offers new insight into Chinese diplomacy in the 1950s and U.S. foreign policy under the Eisenhower administration through a nuanced portrayal of Sino-American interactions"-- _cProvided by publisher.
530			_a2 _ub
655		1	_aElectronic Books.
856	4	0	_uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=2684854&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518 _zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password
942			_cOB _D _eEB _hE.. _m2021 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC
994			_a92 _bNT
999			_c91155 _d91155
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell