000 | 03898cam a2200445 i 4500 | ||
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001 | on1117317788 | ||
003 | OCoLC | ||
005 | 20240726105133.0 | ||
008 | 190816s2020 nyu ob 001 0 eng | ||
010 | _a2019028615 | ||
040 |
_aDLC _beng _erda _cDLC _dOCLCO _dOCLCF _dEBLCP _dJSTOR _dNT _dRECBK _dK6U _dYDX |
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020 |
_a9780231549943 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic) |
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042 | _apcc | ||
043 |
_aa-kr--- _an-us--- _ae-ur--- |
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050 | 0 | 4 |
_aD843 _b.F437 2020 |
049 | _aMAIN | ||
100 | 1 |
_aWells, Samuel F., _cJr., _e1 |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aFearing the worst : _bhow Korea transformed the Cold War / _cSamuel F. Wells, Jr. |
246 | 3 | 0 | _aHow Korea transformed the Cold War |
260 |
_aNew York : _bColumbia University Press, _c(c)2020. |
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300 | _a1 online resource. | ||
336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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_adata file _2rda |
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490 | 1 | _aWoodrow Wilson Center series | |
504 | _a2 | ||
505 | 0 | 0 |
_aStalin Endorses War in Asia -- _tKim Il-sung Plans an Attack -- _tTruman Consolidates US Commitments -- _tJoseph McCarthy Sells the Politics of Fear -- _tPaul Nitze Sounds the Tocsin -- _tNorth Korea Drives South -- _tTruman Reverses Policy -- _tDouglas MacArthur Gambles and Wins -- _tMao Zedong Intervenes Massively -- _tPeng Dehuai and Matthew Ridgway Fight to a Stalemate -- _tGeorge C. Marshall and Robert Lovett Guide a US Buildup -- _tDean Acheson Leads the Defense of Europe -- _tAndrei Tupolev Creates a Strategic Bomber Force -- _tCurtis LeMay Builds the Strategic Air Command -- _tIgor Kurchatov Develops Soviet Nuclear Weapons -- _tWalter Bedell Smith Reforms and Expands the CIA -- _tKorea Transforms the Cold War. |
520 | 0 |
_a"The Worst Case considers how the Cold War and its shape as a strategic confrontation between two superpowers flowed from the Korean War. The book examines the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, each superpower's relations with its allies, and the roles of technology, intelligence, and domestic politics in the decisions of the key nations. The United States reluctantly funded massive increases in nuclear weapons, strategic bombers, and nuclear submarines because the leaders of the Truman administration concluded that Stalin was prepared to start World War III to advance his interests in Asia and Europe. In the absence of any reliable intelligence on Soviet or Chinese decision-making, the key people in the administration accepted the worst case as a real possibility, and prepared for it. What they did not know is that Stalin was working consistently to avoid war with the United States, that Mao was not a puppet of Moscow but had his own ambitious agenda in Asia, and that Kim Il-sung had convinced Stalin that he could produce a low-cost victory in Korea that would give the Soviet Union warm-water ports and a reliable client state strategically positioned to influence Japan and the states of Southeast Asia. Through materials from archives and previously restricted published materials in Russia, China, and North Korea that have become accessible in recent years, The Worst Case provides insights into the reasons behind choices made by leaders in the communist countries to add to the well-researched records on the Western side"-- _cProvided by publisher. |
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_a2 _ub |
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650 | 0 |
_aWorld politics _y1945-1955. |
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650 | 0 |
_aWorld politics _y1955-1965. |
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650 | 0 | _aCold War. | |
650 | 0 |
_aKorean War, 1950-1953 _xInfluence. |
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655 | 1 | _aElectronic Books. | |
856 | 4 | 0 |
_uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=2246272&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518 _zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password |
942 |
_cOB _D _eEB _hD _m2020 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC |
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994 |
_a92 _bNT |
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_c90166 _d90166 |
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_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell |