000			03751cam a22004098i 4500
001			on1028584984
003			OCoLC
005			20240726105113.0
008			180312s2018 dcu ob 001 0 eng
010			_a2018012278
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _cDLC _dOCLCO _dOCLCQ _dOCLCF _dOCLCA _dNT _dYDX _dJSTOR _dEBLCP
020			_a9781626166127 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)
042			_apcc
043			_aa-is--- _aa-le---
050	1	0	_aUA853 _b.I873 2018
049			_aMAIN
100	1		_aMarcus, Raphael D., _e1
245	1	0	_aIsrael's long war with Hezbollah : _bmilitary innovation and adaptation under fire / _cRaphael D. Marcus.
260			_aWashington, DC : _bGeorgetown University Press, _c(c)2018.
300			_a1 online resource
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_adata file _2rda
504			_a2
505	0	0	_aStrategic adaptation -- _tIDF "routine security" and the evolution of Hezbollah (1985-1992) -- _tDeterrence, guerilla warfare, and the establishment of the "rules of the game" (1993-1999) -- _tA change in the strategic equation : the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon -- _tThe erosion of deterrence, the 2006 war, and the Dahiyah doctrine (2000-2017) -- _tConclusion to part I : strategic adaptation -- _tOperational adaptation -- _tThe source and origins of the RMA in Israel -- _tThe RMA "in action" : IDF operations in Lebanon and Hezbollah's adaptation in the 1990s -- _tThe rise of the IDF's Operational Theory Research Institute and systemic operational design -- _tThe 2006 Lebanon war : military adaptation and counter-adaptation -- _tThe "blame game" : a reappraisal of the IDF's 2006 operational concept -- _tConclusion to part II : operational adaptation -- _tConclusions -- _tAfterword : back to the future : IDF force planning and Hezbollah's military adaptation in Syria.
520	0		_aThis book provides the first comprehensive military history of the decades-long conflict between Israel and Lebanon's Hezbollah. It begins in 1985 during the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, includes the Second Lebanon War (a.k.a. the July War) in 2006 and aftermath, and brings the story up to the present. Raphael Marcus conducted extensive research in primary sources in both Hebrew and Arabic and conducted dozens of interviews with Israeli military participants. A second contribution of the book is that it assesses both strategic and operational military learning and adaptation by each side, or lack thereof, during the guerilla and counterguerilla campaigns. His conclusions illustrate the complexity and messiness of military adaptation under fire. It tells the story of slow strategic adaptation and disjointed operational adaptation by the Israeli Defense Forces, where civil-military relations, regional and geostrategic factors, institutional dynamics, domestic pressures, and organizational culture each hindered change. An Afterword in the book discusses adaptation on both sides since the 2006 war and Hezbollah's involvement in the war in Syria. Tensions between Israel and Hezbollah have once again heated up in fall 2017, making this a timely book.
530			_a2 _ub
610	1	0	_aIsrael. _bTseva haganah le-Yiśraʼel _xHistory.
610	2	0	_aHizballah (Lebanon) _xHistory.
650		0	_aOperational art (Military science)
655		1	_aElectronic Books.
856	4	0	_uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1922282&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518 _zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password
942			_cOB _D _eEB _hUA. _m2018 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC
994			_a92 _bNT
999			_c89130 _d89130
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell