000			03209cam a2200397Ii 4500
001			ocn913956516
003			OCoLC
005			20240726105000.0
008			150717t20152015maua ob 001 0 eng d
040			_aNT _beng _erda _epn _cNT _dP@U _dNT _dYDXCP _dIDEBK _dCDX _dCCO _dOCLCF _dJSTOR _dEBLCP _dOCLCA _dOH1 _dMYG _dKSU _dMERUC _dIDB _dVLB _dLOA _dOCLCQ _dCOCUF _dK6U _dCNCGM _dMOR _dZCU _dOCLCQ _dLIP _dUAB _dUKOUP _dU3G _dPIFAG _dFVL _dCOO
020			_a9780262329644 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)
020			_a9780262029216
050	0	4	_aB105 _b.A335 2015
049			_aMAIN
100	1		_aBetti, Arianna, _d1970- _e1
245	1	0	_aAgainst facts /Arianna Betti.
260			_aCambridge, Massachusetts ; _aLondon, England : _bMIT Press, _c(c)2015.
300			_a1 online resource (xxvii, 296 pages) : _billustrations
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_adata file _2rda
504			_a2
505	0	0	_tCompositional facts -- _tCompositional facts -- _tThe unity problem -- _tSolving the unity problem -- _tPropositional facts -- _tReductio -- _tA fallback position, 1 -- _tA fallback position, 2 -- _tConclusion : farewell to facts.
520	0		_a"In this book Arianna Betti argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. She claims that neither of these theories is tenable--neither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form 'the fact that such and such.' There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but, Betti contends, among these entities there are no facts. Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Betti examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, which she distinguishes as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions. She criticizes compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong's truthmaker argument. She then criticizes propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in "the fact that" statements) and what she calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. Betti argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language"--MIT CogNet.
530			_a2 _ub
650		0	_aFacts (Philosophy)
650		4	_aFacts (Philosophy)
650		4	_aPhilosophy & Religion.
650		4	_aPhilosophy.
655		1	_aElectronic Books.
856	4	0	_uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1028928&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518 _zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password
942			_cOB _D _eEB _hB. _m2015 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC
994			_a92 _bNT
999			_c84920 _d84920
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell