000			02860cam a2200349Ki 4500
001			ocn896826678
003			OCoLC
005			20240726104916.0
008			141124s2015 xxk o 000 0 eng d
040			_aNT _beng _erda _epn _cNT _dYDXCP _dCDX _dSTF _dOCLCO _dOCLCF _dNT
020			_a9780191040085 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)
029	1		_aNLGGC _b388108800
050	0	4	_aB790-5739 _b.B686 2015
049			_aNTA
100	1		_aNichols, Shaun. _e1
245	1	0	_aBound : _bessays on free will and responsibility / _cShaun Nichols.
260			_aCorby : _bOxford University Press _c2015.
300			_a1 online resource (192 pages)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_adata file _2rda
504			_a2
520	8		_aThe problem of free will arises from ordinary, commonsense reflection. Shaun Nichols examines these ordinary attitudes from a naturalistic perspective. He offers a psychological account of the origins of the problem of free will. According to his account the problem arises because of two naturally emerging ways of thinking about ourselves and the world, one of which makes determinism plausible while the other makes determinism implausible. Although contemporary cognitive science does not settle whether choices are determined, Nichols argues that our belief in indeterminist choice is grounded in faulty inference and should be regarded as unjustified. However, even if our belief in indeterminist choice is false, it's a further substantive question whether that means that free will doesn't exist. Nichols argues that, because of the flexibility of reference, there is no single answer to whether free will exists. In some contexts, it will be true to say 'free will exists'; in other contexts, it will be false to say that. With this substantive background in place, this book promotes a pragmatic approach to prescriptive issues. In some contexts, the prevailing practical considerations suggest that we should deny the existence of free will and moral responsibility; in other contexts the practical considerations suggest that we should affirm free will and moral responsibility. This allows for the possibility that in some contexts, it is morally apt to exact retributive punishment; in other contexts, it can be apt to take up the exonerating attitude of hard incompatibilism.
530			_a2 _ub
650		0	_aFree will and determinism.
655		1	_aElectronic Books.
856	4	0	_uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=909695&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518 _zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password
942			_cOB _D _eEB _hB- _m2015 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC
994			_a02 _bNT
999			_c82522 _d82522
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell