000			04065cam a2200397Ii 4500
001			on1091029315
003			OCoLC
005			20240726104808.0
008			190401t20192019mau ob 001 0 eng d
040			_aNT _beng _erda _epn _cNT _dEBLCP _dYDX _dOSU _dDEGRU _dOCL _dOCLCQ _dOCLCA _dGRG _dIAI _dOCLCQ _dUKAHL _dJSTOR _dOCLCO _dZ35
020			_a9780674238947 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)
043			_an-us---
050	0	4	_aHD3616 _b.A585 2019
050	0	4	_aHD3616
049			_aMAIN
100	1		_aBaker, Jonathan B., _e1
245	1	0	_aThe antitrust paradigm : _brestoring a competitive economy / _cJonathan B. Baker.
260			_aCambridge, Massachusetts : _bHarvard University Press, _c(c)2019.
300			_a1 online resource (349 pages)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_adata file _2rda
504			_a2
505	0	0	_tMarket power in an era of antitrust -- _tThe faltering political consensus supporting antitrust -- _tPreventing the political misuse of antitrust -- _tRecalibrating error costs and presumptions -- _tErroneous arguments against enforcement -- _tInferring agreement and algorithmic coordination -- _tExclusionary conduct by dominant platforms -- _tThreats to innovation from lessened competition -- _tHarm to suppliers, workers, and platform users -- _tRestoring a competitive economy.
520	0		_aIn the 1970s, when the United States economy was struggling and the term "stagflation" was coined to capture inflation plus stagnant business growth, the "Chicago school" critique of antitrust rules gained ascendance. In the 1980s, during Ronald Reagan's two terms as president, that critique's policy prescriptions-the eliminating of or modifying anticompetitive rules to make them less restrictive-became common practice. As Jonathan Baker writes, "The Chicago approach to antitrust can be understood as a gamble. More relaxed antitrust rules would allow firms to achieve greater efficiencies, which would more than compensate for any risk of firms exercising market power. Put differently, the Chicagoans bet that antitrust reform could achieve long term consumer welfare gains without facilitating the creation of substantial and durable market power." The Antitrust Paradigm presents a wealth of evidence arguing that the Chicagoans lost their bet, and prescribes what should be done about it. Since the 1980s, not only has market power widened, economic productivity decline, and consumer welfare gains been modest at best, but also the economy has changed, most visibly in the information technology and Internet giants that top the financial market's valuation charts. Baker argues that both the failures of antitrust reform and the changed economy demand a new antitrust paradigm, one that restores a competitive economy through strengthened antitrust, recognizes antitrust's political context, and identifies the competitive harms from dominant information technology platforms. His book frames the problem, examines the distinctive competitive problems of the information economy, and concludes with a guide for restoring effective antitrust policies.-- _cProvided by publisher.
520	0		_aAt a time when tech giants have amassed vast market power, Jonathan Baker shows how laws and regulations can be updated to ensure more competition. The sooner courts and antitrust enforcement agencies stop listening to the Chicago school and start paying attention to modern economics, the sooner Americans will reap the benefits of competition.
530			_a2 _ub
650		0	_aAntitrust law _xEconomic aspects _zUnited States.
650		0	_aCompetition _zUnited States.
655		1	_aElectronic Books.
856	4	0	_uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=2092897&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518 _zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password
942			_cOB _D _eEB _hHD. _m2019 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC
994			_a92 _bNT
999			_c78516 _d78516
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell