000			05814cam a2200433Mi 4500
001			on1038483164
003			OCoLC
005			20240726104759.0
008			180602s2018 enk o 000 0 eng d
040			_aEBLCP _beng _erda _cEBLCP _dYDX _dUAB _dLGG _dUKOUP _dNT _dOH1
020			_a9780192546746 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)
050	0	4	_aB833 _b.I476 2018
050	0	4	_aBC177
049			_aMAIN
100	1		_aLord, Errol, _e1
245	1	0	_aThe importance of being rational /Errol Lord.
260			_aOxford, United Kingdom : _bOxford University Press, _c(c)2018.
300			_a1 online resource (xv, 261 pages)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_adata file _2rda
500			_aDescription based upon print version of record.
504			_a2
505	0	0	_aCover; The Importance of Being Rational; Copyright; Dedication; Preface; Contents; PART I: Initial Motivations; 1: Introduction: Reasons Responsiveness, the Reasons Program, and Knowledge-First; 1.1 An Ideological Primer; 1.1.1 Rationality, what; 1.1.2 Reasons Responsiveness as a real definition; 1.1.3 Objective normative reasons,what; 1.1.4 Possessed normative reasons, what; 1.1.5 Correctly responding to possessed normative reasons, what; 1.1.6 The requirements of rationality; 1.2 The Reasons Program and Knowledge-First; 1.2.1 The Reasons Program; 1.2.2 Knowledge-first; 1.3 The Plan
505	0	0	_a2: The Coherent and the Rational2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Debate as it Currently Stands; 2.3 Broome's Challenge; 2.4 What about Coherence?; 2.4.1 Closure; 2.4.2 Narrowly inconsistent intentions; 2.4.3 Broadly inconsistent intentions; 2.4.4 Means-end incoherence; 2.4.5 Akrasia; 2.5 Practical Condition Failures, High-Order Defeat, and Rational Incoherence; 2.5.1 Practical condition failures; 2.5.2 Higher-order defeat; 2.6 The Myth of the Coherent; 2.7 Back to the Beginning; PART II: Possessing Reasons; Summary of Part I and Introduction to Part II
505	0	0	_a3: What it is to Possess a Reason: The Epistemic Condition3.1 Introduction; 3.2 A Taxonomy; 3.3 Against Holding Views; 3.4 Against Low Bar Views; 3.5 Against Non-Factive Views; 3.5.1 For (2); 3.5.2 Back to (1); 3.6 Against P TEAR; 3.7 Conclusion; 4: What it is to Possess a Reason: The Practical Condition; 4.1 The Insufficiency of the Epistemic Condition; 4.2 The Counterexamples: A Diagnosis of What's GoingWrong; 4.3 Filling the Gap; 4.3.1 First attempt: missing beliefs(ish); 4.3.2 Second attempt: attitudinal orientation towards the right and good; 4.4 The Practical Condition and Know-How
505	0	0	_a4.4.1 Inferring desires from knowledge4.4.2 Generalizing; 4.5 Is Possession Composite?; PART III: Correctly Responding to Reasons; Summary of Part II and Introduction to Part III; 5: What it is to Correctly Respond to Reasons; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Acting for Motivating Reasons, Believing for Motivating Reasons, and Being Deviant; 5.3 Reacting for Normative Reasons; 5.4 Reacting for Normative Reasons, Essentially Normative Dispositions, and Know-How; 5.4.1 Essentially normative dispositions and deviancy; 5.4.2 Essentially normative dispositions and know-how
505	0	0	_a5.4.3 Why this is, alas, not enough to get all that we want5.5 Further Upshots; 5.5.1 The relationship between ex post and ex ante rationality; 5.5.2 Speckled hens and the epistemology of perception; 5.5.3 The causal efficacy of the normative; 5.6 Conclusion; 6: Achievements and Intelligibility: For Disjunctivism about Reacting for Reasons; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Reacting for Motivating Reasons and Reacting for Normative Reasons; 6.2.1 Reacting for motivating reasons; 6.2.2 Reacting for normative reasons; 6.3 The Univocal View and the Argument from Illusion; 6.4 Against the Univocal View
500			_a6.4.1 Part I: against the Normative Reasons-First view
520	0		_a"The Importance of Being Rational systematically defends a novel reasons-based account of rationality. The book's central thesis is that what it is for one to be rational is to correctly respond to the normative reasons one possesses. Errol Lord defends novel views about what it is to possess reasons and what it is to correctly respond to reasons. He shows that these views not only help to support the book's main thesis, they also help to resolve several important problems that are independent of rationality. The account of possession provides novel contributions to debates about what determines what we ought to do, and the account of correctly responding to reasons provides novel contributions to debates about causal theories of reacting for reasons. After defending views about possession and correctly responding, Lord shows that the account of rationality can solve two difficult problems about rationality. The first is the New Evil Demon problem. The book argues that the account has the resources to show that internal duplicates necessarily have the same rational status. The second problem concerns the deontic significance of rationality. Recently it has been doubted whether we ought to be rational. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that the requirements of rationality are the requirements that we ultimately ought to comply with. If this is right, then rationality is of fundamental importance to our deliberative lives." -- _cPublisher's website.
530			_a2 _ub
650		0	_aRationalism.
655		1	_aElectronic Books.
856	4	0	_zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password. _uhttpss://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1815776&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518
942			_cOB _D _eEB _hB _m2018 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC
994			_a92 _bNT
999			_c78043 _d78043
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell