000			03613cam a2200397Ii 4500
001			ocn989063296
003			OCoLC
005			20240726104749.0
008			170606s2017 maua ob 001 0 eng d
040			_aNT _beng _erda _epn _cNT _dNT _dYDX _dEBLCP _dJSTOR _dIOG _dDEGRU _dDEBBG
020			_a9780674977266 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)
043			_an-us-ny
050	0	4	_aHF1008 _b.S738 2017
049			_aMAIN
100	1		_aRichman, Barak, _e1
245	1	0	_aStateless commerce : _bthe diamond network and the persistence of relational exchange / _cBarak D. Richman.
260			_aCambridge, Massachusetts : _bHarvard University Press, _c(c)2017.
300			_a1 online resource (xvi, 217 pages) : _billustrations.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_adata file _2rda
520	0		_aIn Stateless Commerce, Barak Richman uses the diamond industry to explore how ethnic trading networks operate and why they persist in the twenty-first century. How, for example, does the Forty-Seventh Street diamond district in midtown Manhattan--surrounded by skyscrapers and sophisticated financial institutions--continue to thrive as an ethnic marketplace that operates like a traditional bazaar? Conventional models of economic and technological progress suggest that such primitive commercial networks would be displaced by new trading paradigms, yet in the heart of New York City the old world persists. Richman's explanation is deceptively simple. Far from being an anachronism, Forty-Seventh Street's ethnic enclave is an adaptive response to the unique pressures of the diamond industry. Ethnic trading networks survive because they better fulfill many functions usually performed by state institutions. While the modern world rests heavily on lawyers, courts, and state coercion, ethnic merchants regularly sell goods and services by relying solely on familiarity, trust, and community enforcement--what economists call "relational exchange." These commercial networks insulate themselves from the outside world because the outside world cannot provide those assurances. Extending the framework of transactional cost and organizational economics, Stateless Commerce draws on rare insider interviews to explain why personal exchange succeeds, even as most global trade succumbs to the forces of modernization, and what it reveals about the limitations of the modern state in governing the economy.-- _cProvided by publisher.
504			_a2
505	0	0	_aStatelessness in context -- _tA case study in statelessness: diamonds, the diamond network, and diamontaires -- _tThe mechanics of statelessness -- _tA theory of statelessness -- _tThe costs of statelessness: cartel behavior and resistance to change -- _tLessons from statelessness: economic history, ethnic networks, and development policy -- _tGoverning statelessness -- _tThe limits of statelessness and an autopsy of cooperation.
530			_a2 _ub
650		0	_aExchange _zNew York (State) _zNew York.
650		0	_aStatelessness.
650		0	_aDiamond industry and trade _zNew York (State) _zNew York.
650		0	_aConsensual contracts _xSocial aspects _zNew York (State) _zNew York.
655		1	_aElectronic Books.
856	4	0	_zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password. _uhttpss://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1527407&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518
942			_cOB _D _eEB _hHF _m2017 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC
994			_a92 _bNT
999			_c77513 _d77513
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell