000			05373cam a2200433Ii 4500
001			ocn975486958
003			OCoLC
005			20240726104747.0
008			170314s2017 enk ob 001 0 eng d
040			_aNT _beng _erda _epn _cNT _dNT _dEBLCP _dYDX _dOCLCF _dUKOUP _dUBY _dCSAIL _dOH1
020			_a9780191089039 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)
050	0	4	_aBF442 _b.C668 2017
049			_aMAIN
100	1		_aSnedegar, Justin, _e1
245	1	0	_aContrastive reasons /Justin Snedegar.
250			_aFirst edition.
260			_aOxford, United Kingdom : _bOxford University Press, _c(c)2017.
300			_a1 online resource (xi, 149 pages)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_adata file _2rda
504			_a2
520	0		_aJustin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not been discussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best account of our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates in both epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention.
505	0	0	_aCover; Contrastive Reasons; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Preface; 1: Contrastivism and Reasons; 1.1 Reasons and Contrastivism; 1.1.1 Reasons; 1.1.2 Contrastivism; 1.2 Reasons and the Contrastivist Program; 1.2.1 Reasons and justification; 1.2.2 Reasons and 'ought'; 1.2.3 Reasons and explanation; 1.3 The Plan; 2: Reason Claims; 2.1 A Simple Argument; 2.2 A Stronger Argument; 2.2.1 The argument; 2.2.2 Response: denying exclusivity; 2.3 Contrastivism; 2.3.1 A contrastive account of reason claims; 2.3.2 A contrastive solution; 2.4 Other 'Rather than' Ascriptions
505	0	0	_a2.5 Negative Reason Existentials2.5.1 The puzzle; 2.5.2 The pragmatic solution; 2.5.3 A contrastivist solution; 2.6 Looking Forward; 3: Favoring; 3.1 Why Resist Contrastivism?; 3.2 Shallow Contrastivism; 3.2.1 A traditional theory of favoring; 3.2.2 A contrastive account of reason claims; 3.2.3 Shallow contrastivism and exclusivity; 3.3 Favoring; 3.3.1 Against non-contrastive favoring; 3.4 Contrastive Reasons and Favoring; 3.4.1 Contrastivism; 3.4.2 A problem; 3.4.3 Reasons and ought; 3.5 Looking Forward; 4: Promotion; 4.1 The Need for Constraints; 4.1.1 Intransitivity
505	0	0	_a4.1.2 Reasons for and subsets4.1.3 Reasons against and supersets; 4.1.4 Entailment relations and deliberation; 4.2 Promotion; 4.2.1 Promotion in the theory of reasons; 4.2.2 Doing nothing; 4.2.3 Not A-ing; 4.2.4 Contrastive promotion; 4.2.5 Motivating resolution sensitivity; 4.3 Contrastive Reasons and Promotion; 4.4 Contrastive Reasons as Better Reasons?; 4.5 Providing the Constraints; 4.5.1 Transitivity; 4.5.2 Non-exhaustivity; 4.5.3 Resolution sensitivity; 4.5.4 Other entailments: Unions and intersections; 4.6 Non-Promotional Reasons; 4.7 Where we Are; 5: Intransitivity
505	0	0	_a5.1 Transitivity and Reasons5.2 Intransitivity; 5.2.1 The Repugnant Conclusion; 5.2.2 Resisting the first step; 5.2.3 The Mere Addition Paradox; 5.3 Intransitivity and Contrastivism; 5.3.1 Two kinds of intransitivity; 5.4 Contrast-Sensitive Importance; 5.4.1 Strength of reasons and importance of objectives; 5.4.2 Contrast-sensitive importance; 5.4.3 Contrastivism about reasons and importance; 5.5 Remaining Questions; 5.5.1 What should I do?; 5.5.2 Why so uncommon?; 5.6 Conclusion; 6: Withholding; 6.1 Withholding Belief and Contrastive Reasons; 6.1.1 Contrastive epistemic reasons
505	0	0	_a6.1.2 A contrastive account of rational withholding6.1.3 A non-contrastive account; 6.1.4 Ties; 6.1.5 A contrastivist explanation; 6.1.6 Reasons not to withhold belief?; 6.2 Withholding Intention; 6.2.1 A unified account?; 6.2.2 Contrastive practical reasons; 6.2.3 A contrastive account of rational withholding of intention; 6.2.4 A unified account; 6.3 Wrap Up; References; Index
530			_a2 _ub
650		0	_aReasoning.
650		0	_aContrast (Philosophy)
650		0	_aNormativity (Ethics)
655		1	_aElectronic Books.
856	4	0	_zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password. _uhttpss://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1484901&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518
942			_cOB _D _eEB _hBF _m2017 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC
994			_a92 _bNT
999			_c77405 _d77405
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell