000			03064cam a2200385Ki 4500
001			ocn895162204
003			OCoLC
005			20240726104721.0
008			141113s2014 xxk o 000 0 eng d
040			_aNT _beng _erda _epn _cNT _dNT
020			_a9780191034787 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)
050	0	4	_aB841 _b.S454 2014
049			_aNTA
100	1		_aZahavi, Dan, _e1
245	1	0	_aSelf and other : _bexploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame / _cDan Zahavi.
250			_aFirst edition.
260			_aOxford : _bOxford University Press, _c(c)2014.
300			_a1 online resource (288 pages)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_adata file _2rda
504			_a2
520	8		_aCan you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? How do we at all come to understand others? Does empathy amount to and allow for a distinct experiential acquaintance with others, and if so, what does that tell us about the nature of selfhood and social cognition? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter? Engaging with debates and findings in classical phenomenology, in philosophy of mind and in various empirical disciplines, Dan Zahavi's new book Self and Other offers answers to these questions. Discussing such diverse topics as self-consciousness, phenomenal externalism, mindless coping, mirror self-recognition, autism, theory of mind, embodied simulation, joint attention, shame, time-consciousness, embodiment, narrativity, self-disorders, expressivity and Buddhist no-self accounts, Zahavi argues that any theory of consciousness that wishes to take the subjective dimension of our experiential life serious must endorse a minimalist notion of self. At the same time, however, he also contends that an adequate account of the self has to recognize its multifaceted character, and that various complementary accounts must be integrated, if we are to do justice to its complexity. Thus, while arguing that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed and not constitutively dependent upon others, Zahavi also acknowledges that there are dimensions of the self and types of self-experience that are other-mediated. The final part of the book exemplifies this claim through a close analysis of shame.
530			_a2 _ub
650		0	_aSubjectivity.
650		0	_aIntersubjectivity.
650		0	_aEmpathy.
650		0	_aShame.
655		1	_aElectronic Books.
856	4	0	_zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password. _uhttpss://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=904026&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518
942			_cOB _D _eEB _hB. _m2014 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC
994			_a02 _bNT
999			_c75909 _d75909
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell