000			03100nam a2200361Ki 4500
001			ocn863157383
003			OCoLC
005			20240726104710.0
008			131118s2014 nyu o 000 0 eng d
040			_aNT _beng _erda _epn _cNT
020			_a9780199316519 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)
043			_aa-vt--- _an-us---
050	0	4	_aDS557 _b.W478 2014
049			_aNTA
100	1		_aDaddis, Gregory A., _d1967- _e1
245	1	0	_aWestmoreland's war : _breassessing American strategy in Vietnam / _cGregory Daddis.
260			_aNew York : _bOxford University Press, _c(c)2014.
300			_a1 online resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_adata file _2rda
504			_a2
520	0		_a"General William C. Westmoreland has long been derided for his failed strategy of "attrition" in the Vietnam War. Historians have argued that Westmoreland's strategy placed a premium on high "body counts" through a "big unit war" that relied almost solely on search and destroy missions. Many believe the U.S. Army failed in Vietnam because of Westmoreland's misguided and narrow strategy. In a groundbreaking reassessment of American military strategy in Vietnam, Gregory Daddis overturns conventional wisdom and shows how Westmoreland did indeed develop a comprehensive campaign which included counterinsurgency, civic action, and the importance of gaining political support from the South Vietnamese population. Exploring the realities of a large, yet not wholly unconventional environment, Daddis reinterprets the complex political and military battlefields of Vietnam. Without searching for blame, he analyzes how American civil and military leaders developed strategy and how Westmoreland attempted to implement a sweeping strategic vision. Westmoreland's War is a landmark reinterpretation of one of America's most divisive wars, outlining the multiple, interconnected aspects of American military strategy in Vietnam-combat operations, pacification, nation building, and the training of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Daddis offers a critical reassessment of one of the defining moments in American history"-- _cProvided by publisher.
505	0	0	_aMachine generated contents note: -- _tPreface -- _tIntroduction: A Word on War and Strategy -- _t1. Conceiving Strategy for the Cold War Era -- _t2. From Advice to Support to War -- _t3. The Myth of Attrition in Vietnam -- _t4. On Bewildering Battlefields: Implementing Westmoreland's Strategy -- _t5. The Parallel War -- _t6. Training an Uncertain Army -- _tConclusion: When Strategy May Not Matter.
530			_a2 _ub
650		0	_aVietnam War, 1961-1975 _xCampaigns.
655		1	_aElectronic Books.
856	4	0	_zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password. _uhttpss://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=663607&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518
942			_cOB _D _eEB _hDS. _m2014 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC
994			_a02 _bNT
999			_c75276 _d75276
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell