000			03480cam a2200457 i 4500
001			ocm28065835
003			OCoLC
005			20240726104058.0
008			930413s1994 enka b 001 0 eng
010			_a93010910
015			_aGB94-34495
020			_a9780521433341
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _cDLC _dUKM _dBAKER _dNLGGC _dBTCTA _dYDXCP _dUBC _dZCU _dOCLCQ _dSBI
049			_aSBIM
050	0	4	_aB105 _b.L397 1994
100	1		_aCarroll, John W, _e1
245	1	0	_aLaws of nature /John W. Carroll.
260			_aCambridge [England] ; _aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _c(c)1994.
300			_aix, 200 pages : _billistrations ; _c23 cm.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aCambridge studies in philosophy
505	0	0	_aCHAPTER 1 - Centrality. -- _t1.1. Reduction and the wholesome base -- _t1.2.Skirting empiricist influences -- _t1.3. Methodology -- _t1.4. Three features of laws --
505	0	0	_aCHAPTER 2 - Humean analyses. -- _t2.1. Naive regularity analyses -- _t2.2. Induction, laws, and lawhood -- _t2.3. Simplicity, strength, and best balance -- _t2.4. Epistemology and metaphysics --
505	0	0	_aCHAPTER 3 - Humean supervenience -- _t3.1. The mirror argument -- _t3.2. Some conceptual geography: A look at chance -- _t3.3. Vacuous laws and the varieties of supervenience -- _t3.4. Ethics, mind, and the laws of nature --
505	0	0	_aCHAPTER 4 - A realist perspective -- _t4.1. Lawless reality -- _t4.2. Van Fraassen's antirealism -- _t4.3. The argument for Humeanism --
505	0	0	_aCHAPTER 5 - Causation -- _t5.1. The causal commitments of nomic dependencies -- _t5.2. Lawfully equivalent epiphenomena -- _t5.3. Probabilistic causation -- _t5.4. Instantaneous causation -- _t5.5. Causal commitments confirmed --
505	0	0	_aCHAPTER 6 - The limits of inquiry --
505	0	0	_aAPPENDICES. -- _tAppendix A: Nomic platonism -- _tA.1. Universals, lawhood, and reduction -- _tA.2. Abstract particulars, lawhood, and reduction -- _tA.3. Ontology and the problem of laws -- _tAppendix B: Defending (South Carolina) -- _tB.1. Direct challenges -- _tB.2. An indirect challenge.
520	0		_aJohn W. Carroll undertakes a careful philosophical examination of laws of nature, causation, and other related topics. He argues that laws of nature are not susceptible to the sort of philosophical treatment preferred by empiricists. Indeed, he shows that empirically pure matters of fact need not even determine what the laws are. Similar, and even stronger, conclusions are drawn about causation. Replacing the traditional view of laws and causation as requiring some kind of foundational legitimacy, the author argues that these phenomena are inextricably intertwined with everything else. This distinctively clear and detailed discussion of what it is to be a law will be valuable to a broad swathe of philosophers in metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science.
530			_a2 _ub
650		0	_aLaw (Philosophical concept)
650		0	_aPhilosophy of nature.
653			_aEpistemology Philosophy
655		1	_aEpistemology.
907			_a.b15469931 _b02-06-12 _c04-23-08
942			_cBK _hB _m1994 _i2011-2012 _eSIERRA REGOORD _2lcc _QCC _f0 _w50.00
945			_g1 _i31923001670278 _j2 _lcimc _o- _p0.00 _q- _r- _s- -- _t61 _u0 _v0 _w0 _x0 _y.i19018071 _z11-14-11
998			_b11-14-11 _cm _da
999			_c55312 _d55312
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell