000			02002cam a2200433 i 4500
001			ocn695560084
003			OCoLC
005			20240828130829.0
008			101222s2011 enk b 001 0 eng
010			_a2010052009
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _cDLC _dYDX _dYDXCP _dBWX _dMIX _dDTM _dCDX _dMYG _dSTF _dBDX _dOCLCF _dOCLCQ _dCHVBK _dOCLCQ _dTFW _dUKMGB _dOCLCQ _dIL4J6 _dOCLCO _dOCLCQ _dOCLCL _dOCLCQ _dSBI
015			_aGBB1A5169 _2bnb
016	7		_a015884335 _2Uk
020			_a9780199794331
029	1		_aAU@ _b000046459288
029	1		_aCHBIS _b006296683
029	1		_aCHDSB _b005680913
029	1		_aCHVBK _b115723870
029	1		_aCHVBK _b172852692
029	1		_aNZ1 _b14027145
029	1		_aUKMGB _b015884335
035			_a(OCoLC)695560084
042			_apcc
050	0	0	_aBD238.M478.T478 2011
049			_aSBIM
100	1		_aMcMyler, Benjamin, _e1
245	1	0	_aTestimony, trust, and authority / _cBenjamin McMyler. _hPR
260			_aOxford ; _aNew York, New York : _bOxford University Press, _c2011.
300			_aviii, 178 pages ; _c25 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_a2
505	0		_aTestimony as a philosophical problem -- _tKnowing at second hand -- _tThree models of epistemic dependence -- _tTrustung a person -- _tAuthority, autonomy, and second-personal reasons.
520	8		_aMuch of what we know is acquired by taking things on the word of other people whom we trust and treat as authorities concerning what to believe. But what exactly is it to take someone's word for something? What is it to treat another as an authority concerning what to believe, and what is it to trust this person for the truth? Benjamin McMyler argues that philosophers have failed to appreciate the nature and significance of our epistemic dependence on the words of others.
650		0	_aTestimony (Theory of knowledge)
942			_cBK _hBD238.T47 _m2011 _QCC _x _8NFIC _w _z
994			_aC0 _bSBI
999			_c104385 _d104385
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell