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042 _apcc
049 _aSBIM
050 0 4 _aBJ1461.O98.F744 2011
245 0 0 _aFree will and modern science /
_cedited by Richard Swinburne.
_hPR
260 _aOxford ;
_aNew York :
_bOxford University Press,
_c(c)2011.
300 _axviii, 206 pages :
_billustrations ;
_c24 cm.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _aunmediated
_bn
_2rdamedia
338 _avolume
_bnc
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _aBritish Academy original paperbacks
500 _a"Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press."
504 _a2
505 0 0 _aIntroduction : plan of the volume/
_rrichard Swinburne --
_tDoes brain science change our view of free will? / Patrick Haggard --
_tLibet and the case for free will scepticism/
_rTim Bayne --
_tPhysicalism and the determination of action/
_rFrank Jackson --
_tDualism and the determination of action/
_rRichard Winburne --
_tOn determinacy or its absence in the brain/
_rHarald Atmanspacher and Stefan Rotter --
_tGodel's incompleteness theorems, free will and mathematical thought/
_rSolomon Feferman --
_tFeferman on Godel and free will : a response to chapter 6/
_rJ.R. Lucas --
_tThe impossibility of ultimate responsibility? / Galen Strawson --
_tMoral responsibility and the concept of agency/
_rHelen Steward --
_tSubstance dualisma nd its rationale/
_rHoward Robinson --
_tWhat kind of responsibility must criminal law presuppose? / R.A. Duff.
520 1 _a"Do humans have a free choice of which actions to perform? Three recent developments of modern science can help us to answer this question. First, new investigative tools have enabled us to study the processes in our brains which accompanying our decisions. The pioneer work of Benjamin Libet has led many neuroscientists to hold the view that our conscious intentions do not cause our bodily movements but merely accompany them. Then, Quantum Theory suggests that not all physical events are fully determined by their causes, and so opens the possibility that not all brain events may be fully determined by their causes, and so maybe - if neuroscience does not rule this out - there is a role for intentions after all. Finally, a theorem of mathematics, Godel's theory, has been interpreted to suggest that the initial conditions and laws of development of a mathematician's brain could not fully determine which mathematical conjectures he sees to be true. Papers by Patrick Haggard, Tim Bayne, Harald Atmanspacher and Stefan Rotter, Solomon Feferman, and John Lucas investigate these issues. The extent to which human behaviour is determined by brain events may well depend on whether conscious events, such as intentions, are themselves merely brain events, or whether they are separate events which interact with brain events (perhaps in the radical form that intentions are events in our soul, and not in our body). The papers of Frank Jackson, Richard Swinburne, and Howard Robinson investigate these issues. The remaining papers, of Galen Strawson, Helen Steward, and R.A. Duff, consider what kind of free will we need in order to be morally responsible for our actions or to be held guilty in a court of law. Is it sufficient merely that our actions are uncaused by brain events, or what?."--Publisher's description.
530 _a2
_ub
650 0 _aFree will and determinism.
650 0 _aHuman behavior.
650 0 _aNeurosciences.
650 0 _aQuantum theory.
650 0 _aMathematics.
655 4 _aAufsatzsammlung.
700 1 _aBritish Academy.
700 1 _aOxford University Press.
700 1 _aSwinburne, Richard.
830 0 _aBritish Academy original paperbacks.
942 _DCharles Still
_m(c)2011.
_cBK
_hBJ1461
_i2021-12-14
_2ddc
_w34.11
999 _c102962
_d102962
902 _a1
_bCynthia Snell
_c1
_dCynthia Snell