000 | 04722cam a2200601 i 4500 | ||
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001 | ocn751794764 | ||
003 | OCoLC | ||
005 | 20240726110913.0 | ||
008 | 110803t20112011enka b 001 0 eng c | ||
010 | _a2012359044 | ||
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016 | 7 |
_a015864325 _2Uk |
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020 | _a9780197264898 | ||
029 | 1 |
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035 | _a(OCoLC)751794764 | ||
040 |
_aUKMGB _beng _erda _cUKMGB _dDEBBG _dYDXCP _dOSU _dOXF _dPUL _dCOO _dCDX _dYUS _dBTCTA _dBWX _dDLC _dOCLCF _dP4I _dOCLCA _dOCLCQ _dRCT _dGBVCP _dOCLCQ _dOCLCO _dUPM _dOCLCO _dGZM _dOCLCO _dPAU _dOCLCO _dSNN _dOCLCO _dUKMGB _dOCLCA _dCNCLB _dLUN _dIL4J6 _dOCLCO _dOCLCQ _dOCLCA _dSBI |
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042 | _apcc | ||
049 | _aSBIM | ||
050 | 0 | 4 | _aBJ1461.O98.F744 2011 |
245 | 0 | 0 |
_aFree will and modern science / _cedited by Richard Swinburne. _hPR |
260 |
_aOxford ; _aNew York : _bOxford University Press, _c(c)2011. |
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300 |
_axviii, 206 pages : _billustrations ; _c24 cm. |
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336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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337 |
_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia |
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338 |
_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier |
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490 | 1 | _aBritish Academy original paperbacks | |
500 | _a"Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press." | ||
504 | _a2 | ||
505 | 0 | 0 |
_aIntroduction : plan of the volume/ _rrichard Swinburne -- _tDoes brain science change our view of free will? / Patrick Haggard -- _tLibet and the case for free will scepticism/ _rTim Bayne -- _tPhysicalism and the determination of action/ _rFrank Jackson -- _tDualism and the determination of action/ _rRichard Winburne -- _tOn determinacy or its absence in the brain/ _rHarald Atmanspacher and Stefan Rotter -- _tGodel's incompleteness theorems, free will and mathematical thought/ _rSolomon Feferman -- _tFeferman on Godel and free will : a response to chapter 6/ _rJ.R. Lucas -- _tThe impossibility of ultimate responsibility? / Galen Strawson -- _tMoral responsibility and the concept of agency/ _rHelen Steward -- _tSubstance dualisma nd its rationale/ _rHoward Robinson -- _tWhat kind of responsibility must criminal law presuppose? / R.A. Duff. |
520 | 1 | _a"Do humans have a free choice of which actions to perform? Three recent developments of modern science can help us to answer this question. First, new investigative tools have enabled us to study the processes in our brains which accompanying our decisions. The pioneer work of Benjamin Libet has led many neuroscientists to hold the view that our conscious intentions do not cause our bodily movements but merely accompany them. Then, Quantum Theory suggests that not all physical events are fully determined by their causes, and so opens the possibility that not all brain events may be fully determined by their causes, and so maybe - if neuroscience does not rule this out - there is a role for intentions after all. Finally, a theorem of mathematics, Godel's theory, has been interpreted to suggest that the initial conditions and laws of development of a mathematician's brain could not fully determine which mathematical conjectures he sees to be true. Papers by Patrick Haggard, Tim Bayne, Harald Atmanspacher and Stefan Rotter, Solomon Feferman, and John Lucas investigate these issues. The extent to which human behaviour is determined by brain events may well depend on whether conscious events, such as intentions, are themselves merely brain events, or whether they are separate events which interact with brain events (perhaps in the radical form that intentions are events in our soul, and not in our body). The papers of Frank Jackson, Richard Swinburne, and Howard Robinson investigate these issues. The remaining papers, of Galen Strawson, Helen Steward, and R.A. Duff, consider what kind of free will we need in order to be morally responsible for our actions or to be held guilty in a court of law. Is it sufficient merely that our actions are uncaused by brain events, or what?."--Publisher's description. | |
530 |
_a2 _ub |
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650 | 0 | _aFree will and determinism. | |
650 | 0 | _aHuman behavior. | |
650 | 0 | _aNeurosciences. | |
650 | 0 | _aQuantum theory. | |
650 | 0 | _aMathematics. | |
655 | 4 | _aAufsatzsammlung. | |
700 | 1 | _aBritish Academy. | |
700 | 1 | _aOxford University Press. | |
700 | 1 | _aSwinburne, Richard. | |
830 | 0 | _aBritish Academy original paperbacks. | |
942 |
_DCharles Still _m(c)2011. _cBK _hBJ1461 _i2021-12-14 _2ddc _w34.11 |
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999 |
_c102962 _d102962 |
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902 |
_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell |