000			03179cam a2200469 i 4500
001			ocn972092973
003			OCoLC
005			20240726110902.0
008			161206s2017 nyu b 001 0 eng
010			_a2016052281
015			_aGBB751686 _2bnb
016	7		_a018271714 _2Uk
020			_a9781138293441
029	1		_aCHBIS _b010860083
029	1		_aCHDSB _b006695678
029	1		_aCHVBK _b479416702
029	1		_aCHVBK _b482944560
029	1		_aUKMGB _b018271714
035			_a(OCoLC)972092973
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _cDLC _dBDX _dOCLCF _dYDX _dIHT _dOCLCO _dCHVBK _dOCLCO _dOCLCA _dOCLCQ _dOCLCA _dUKMGB _dSBI
042			_apcc
049			_aSBIM
050	0	4	_aBJ1031.H333.I534 2017
050	0	4	_aBJ1031
100	1		_aHartman, Robert J., _e1
245	1	0	_aIn defense of moral luck : _bwhy luck often affects praiseworthiness and blameworthiness / _cRobert J. Hartman. _hPR
250			_a1 [edition.
260			_aNew York : _bRoutledge, Taylor and Francis Group, _c(c)2017.
300			_aix, 152 pages ; _c24 cm.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aRoutledge studies in ethics and moral theory ; _v38
505	0	0	_aIntroducing the problem of moral luck -- _tThe concept of moral luck -- _tAgainst the skeptical denial of moral luck -- _tAgainst the non-skeptical denial of moral luck -- _tIn defense of moral luck -- _tError theory for the luck-free intuition.
520	0		_aThe problem of moral luck is that there is a contradiction in our common sense ideas about moral responsibility. In one strand of our thinking, we believe that a person can become more blameworthy by luck. For example, two reckless drivers manage their vehicles in the same way, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. We blame the killer driver more than the merely reckless driver, because we believe that the killer driver is more blameworthy. Nevertheless, this idea contradicts another feature of our thinking captured in this moral principle: A person's blameworthiness cannot be affected by that which is not within her control. Thus, our ordinary thinking about moral responsibility implies that the drivers are and are not equally blameworthy. In Defense of Moral Luck aims to make progress in resolving this contradiction. Hartman defends the claim that certain kinds of luck in results, circumstance, and character can partially determine the degree of a person's blameworthiness. He also explains why there is a puzzle in our thinking about moral responsibility in the first place if luck often affects a person's praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. Furthermore, the book's methodology provides a unique way to advance the moral luck debate with arguments from diverse areas in philosophy that do not bottom out in standard pro-moral luck intuitions. --
530			_a2
530			_a2 _ub
650		0	_aFortune _xMoral and ethical aspects.
830		0	_aRoutledge studies in ethics and moral theory ; _v38.
942			_cBK _hBJ _m2017 _eAMAZON _k65.06 _i2021-05-15 _n10-1411-7022-GENL _2lcc _O113-3953684-7401002 _w54.95
999			_c102404 _d102404
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell