000			03042cam a2200373Ii 4500
001			ocn874133263
003			OCoLC
005			20240726105451.0
008			130510t20142014maua ob 001 0 eng d
040			_aE7B _beng _erda _epn _cE7B _dOCLCO _dNHM _dN15 _dGPM _dCDX _dOSU _dYDXCP _dB24X7 _dCUS _dNT _dIDEBK _dLRU _dUMC _dJSTOR _dOCLCF _dEBLCP _dOCLCQ
020			_a9781306203678
050	0	4	_aHJ2305 _b.T397 2014
049			_aMAIN
100	1		_aSlemrod, Joel, _e1
245	1	0	_aTax systems /Joel Slemrod and Christian Gillitzer.
260			_aCambridge, Massachusetts : _bThe MIT Press, _c(c)2014.
300			_a1 online resource (x, 223 pages) : _billustrations.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_adata file _2rda
490	1		_aZeuthen lecture book series
504			_a2
505	0	0	_aIntroduction and Motivation. 1. The Need for Tax-System Analysis ; 2. Standard Optimal Tax Models -- _tII. Building Blocks of Tax Systems. 3. Multiple Behavioral Margins ; 4. Multiple Sources of Costs ; 5. Tax Base Elasticity ; 6. Multiple Tax-System Instruments -- _tIII. Optimal Tax Systems. 7. General Model ; 8. Standard Instruments with New Costs ; 9. Endogenous Elasticity ; 10. Optimal Observability and Complexity ; 11. Notches and Optimal Line Drawing -- _tIV. Future Directions and Closing Thoughts. 12. Future Directions ; 13. Conclusion.
520	0		_a"Despite its theoretical elegance, the standard optimal tax model has significant limitations. In this book, Joel Slemrod and Christian Gillitzer argue that tax analysis must move beyond the emphasis on optimal tax rates and bases to consider such aspects of taxation as administration, compliance, and remittance. Slemrod and Gillitzer explore what they term a tax-systems approach, which takes tax evasion seriously; revisits the issue of remittance, or who writes the check to cover tax liability (employer or employee, retailer or consumer); incorporates administrative and compliance costs; recognizes a range of behavioral responses to tax rates; considers nonstandard instruments, including tax base breadth and enforcement effort; and acknowledges that tighter enforcement is sometimes a more socially desirable way to raise revenue than an increase in statutory tax rates. Policy makers, Slemrod and Gillitzer argue, would be well advised to recognize the interrelationship of tax rates, bases, enforcement, and administration, and acknowledge that tax policy is really tax-systems policy."--Publisher's website.
530			_a2 _ub
650		0	_aTaxation.
655		1	_aElectronic Books.
700	1		_aGillitzer, Christian, _e1
856	4	0	_uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=675785&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518 _zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password
942			_cOB _D _eEB _hHJ _m2014 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC
994			_a92 _bNT
999			_c101193 _d101193
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell