000 | 03882nam a2200361Ki 4500 | ||
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001 | ocn865508589 | ||
003 | OCoLC | ||
005 | 20240726105447.0 | ||
008 | 131217s1993 nyu ob 001 0 eng d | ||
040 |
_aNT _beng _erda _epn _cNT |
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020 |
_a9780199938162 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)l((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)ctronic bk. |
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043 | _an-us--- | ||
050 | 0 | 4 |
_aE835 _b.S688 1993 |
049 | _aNTA | ||
100 | 1 |
_aDivine, Robert A. _e1 |
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245 | 1 | 0 | _aThe Sputnik challenge /Robert A. Divine. |
260 |
_aNew York : _bOxford University Press, _c(c)1993. |
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300 | _a1 online resource (xviii, 245 pages) | ||
336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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347 |
_adata file _2rda |
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504 | _a2 | ||
520 | 0 | _aOn October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched a 184-pound metal ball called Sputnik into orbit around the Earth, and America plummeted into a panic. Nuclear weapon Designer Edward Teller claimed that the United States had lost "a battle more important and greater than Pearl Harbor," and magazine articles appeared with such headlines as "Are We Americans Going Soft?" In the White House, President Eisenhower seemed to do nothing, leading Kennedy in 1960 to proclaim a "missile gap" in the Soviets' favor. Rarely has public perception been so dramatically at odds with reality. In The Sputnik Challenge, Robert Divine provides a fascinating look at Eisenhower's handling of the early space race - a story of public uproar, secret U-2 flights, bungled missile tests, the first spy satellite, political maneuvering, and scientific triumph. He recreates the national hysteria over the first two Sputnik launches, illustrating the anxious handwringing that the Democrats (led by Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson) aggressively played for political gain. Divine takes us to private White House meetings, showing how Eisenhower worked closely with science adviser James Killian, allowing him to take the lead in creating a civilian agency - NASA - which provided intelligent and forceful leadership for American space programs. But the President also knew from priceless intelligence U-2 flights over the U.S.S.R. that he had little to fear from the touted missile gap, and he fought to limit the growth and multiplication of military missile programs. Eisenhower's assurance, however, rested on classified information, and he did little to instill his confidence in the public. Nor could he boast of his early support for the secret spy satellite program (which quickly replaced the U-2 plane after Gary Powers was shot down in 1960). So the public continued to worry, feeding the national movement for educational reform as well as congressional maneuvering over funding for numerous strategic projects. Eisenhower, Divine writes, possessed keen strategic vision and a sure sense of budgetary priorities, but ultimately he flunked a crucial test of leadership when he failed to reassure the frightened public that their fears were groundless. As a result, he also failed in his goal to limit military spending as well - which led to a real missile gap in reverse. Incisively written and deeply researched, The Sputnik Challenge provides a briskly-paced history of the origins of NASA, the space race, and the age of the ICBM. | |
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_a2 _ub |
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600 | 1 | 0 |
_aEisenhower, Dwight D. _q(Dwight David), _d1890-1969. |
650 | 0 |
_aArtificial satellites _xSocial aspects _zUnited States. |
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655 | 1 | _aElectronic Books. | |
856 | 4 | 0 |
_uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=672470&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518 _zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password |
942 |
_cOB _D _eEB _hE _m1993 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC |
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994 |
_a02 _bNT |
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999 |
_c101062 _d101062 |
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902 |
_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell |