000 03882nam a2200361Ki 4500
001 ocn865508589
003 OCoLC
005 20240726105447.0
008 131217s1993 nyu ob 001 0 eng d
040 _aNT
_beng
_erda
_epn
_cNT
020 _a9780199938162
_q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)l((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)ctronic bk.
043 _an-us---
050 0 4 _aE835
_b.S688 1993
049 _aNTA
100 1 _aDivine, Robert A.
_e1
245 1 0 _aThe Sputnik challenge /Robert A. Divine.
260 _aNew York :
_bOxford University Press,
_c(c)1993.
300 _a1 online resource (xviii, 245 pages)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _adata file
_2rda
504 _a2
520 0 _aOn October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched a 184-pound metal ball called Sputnik into orbit around the Earth, and America plummeted into a panic. Nuclear weapon Designer Edward Teller claimed that the United States had lost "a battle more important and greater than Pearl Harbor," and magazine articles appeared with such headlines as "Are We Americans Going Soft?" In the White House, President Eisenhower seemed to do nothing, leading Kennedy in 1960 to proclaim a "missile gap" in the Soviets' favor. Rarely has public perception been so dramatically at odds with reality. In The Sputnik Challenge, Robert Divine provides a fascinating look at Eisenhower's handling of the early space race - a story of public uproar, secret U-2 flights, bungled missile tests, the first spy satellite, political maneuvering, and scientific triumph. He recreates the national hysteria over the first two Sputnik launches, illustrating the anxious handwringing that the Democrats (led by Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson) aggressively played for political gain. Divine takes us to private White House meetings, showing how Eisenhower worked closely with science adviser James Killian, allowing him to take the lead in creating a civilian agency - NASA - which provided intelligent and forceful leadership for American space programs. But the President also knew from priceless intelligence U-2 flights over the U.S.S.R. that he had little to fear from the touted missile gap, and he fought to limit the growth and multiplication of military missile programs. Eisenhower's assurance, however, rested on classified information, and he did little to instill his confidence in the public. Nor could he boast of his early support for the secret spy satellite program (which quickly replaced the U-2 plane after Gary Powers was shot down in 1960). So the public continued to worry, feeding the national movement for educational reform as well as congressional maneuvering over funding for numerous strategic projects. Eisenhower, Divine writes, possessed keen strategic vision and a sure sense of budgetary priorities, but ultimately he flunked a crucial test of leadership when he failed to reassure the frightened public that their fears were groundless. As a result, he also failed in his goal to limit military spending as well - which led to a real missile gap in reverse. Incisively written and deeply researched, The Sputnik Challenge provides a briskly-paced history of the origins of NASA, the space race, and the age of the ICBM.
530 _a2
_ub
600 1 0 _aEisenhower, Dwight D.
_q(Dwight David),
_d1890-1969.
650 0 _aArtificial satellites
_xSocial aspects
_zUnited States.
655 1 _aElectronic Books.
856 4 0 _uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=672470&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518
_zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password
942 _cOB
_D
_eEB
_hE
_m1993
_QOL
_R
_x
_8NFIC
_2LOC
994 _a02
_bNT
999 _c101062
_d101062
902 _a1
_bCynthia Snell
_c1
_dCynthia Snell