000			03325cam a2200409Li 4500
001			ocn863595845
003			OCoLC
005			20240726105445.0
008			131106s2013 nyu ob 001 0 eng d
040			_aYDXCP _beng _erda _cYDXCP _dOCLCO _dLGG _dNT
020			_a9780801469466 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)l((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic)ctronic bk.
043			_aa-ta--- _aa-uz---
050	0	4	_aDK928 _b.S738 2013
049			_aNTA
100	1		_aMarkowitz, Lawrence P., _d1970- _e1
245	1	0	_aState erosion _bunlootable resources and unruly elites in Central Asia / _cLawrence P. Markowitz.
260			_aIthaca : _bCornell University Press, _c(c)2013.
300			_a1 online resource (pages cm.)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_adata file _2rda
504			_a2
505	0	0	_aRethinking the resource curse -- _tRents and resources under soviet rule -- _tPathways to failure : Tajikistan and Uzbekistan -- _tTajikistan's fractious state -- _tCoercion and rent-seeking in Uzbekistan -- _tWeak and failed states in comparative perspective.
520	0		_a"State failure is a central challenge to international peace and security in the post-Cold War era. Yet theorizing on the causes of state failure remains surprisingly limited. In State Erosion, Lawrence P. Markowitz draws on his extensive fieldwork in two Central Asian republics--Tajikistan, where state institutions fragmented into a five-year civil war from 1992 through 1997, and Uzbekistan, which constructed one of the largest state security apparatuses in post-Soviet Eurasia--to advance a theory of state failure focused on unlootable resources, rent seeking, and unruly elites. In Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and other countries with low capital mobility--where resources cannot be extracted, concealed, or transported to market without state intervention--local elites may control resources, but they depend on patrons to convert their resources into rents. Markowitz argues that different rent-seeking opportunities either promote the cooptation of local elites to the regime or incite competition over rents, which in turn lead to either cohesion or fragmentation. Markowitz distinguishes between weak states and failed states, challenges the assumption that state failure in a country begins at the center and radiates outward, and expands the "resource curse" argument to include cash crop economies, where mechanisms of state failure differ from those involved in fossil fuels and minerals"-- _cPublisher's Web site.
530			_a2 _ub
650		0	_aFailed states _zTajikistan.
650		0	_aNatural resources _xPolitical aspects _zTajikistan.
650		0	_aNatural resources _xPolitical aspects _zUzbekistan.
650		0	_aElite (Social sciences) _xPolitical activity _zTajikistan.
650		0	_aElite (Social sciences) _xPolitical activity _zUzbekistan.
655		1	_aElectronic Books.
856	4	0	_uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=671521&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518 _zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password
942			_cOB _D _eEB _hDK. _m2013 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC
994			_a02 _bNT
999			_c100948 _d100948
902			_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell