000 | 03406cam a2200445 i 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | ocn865508923 | ||
003 | OCoLC | ||
005 | 20240726105445.0 | ||
008 | 940826s1995 nyu ob 001 0 eng | ||
010 | _a2021701161 | ||
040 |
_aDLC _beng _epn _erda _cDLC _dJSTOR _dOCLCF _dYDXCP _dEBLCP _dP@U _dMERUC _dIOG _dEZ9 _dTXC _dLVT _dSTF _dNAM _dDKC _dKIJ _dINARC _dMM9 _dNT |
||
020 |
_a9780801469909 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic) |
||
020 |
_a9780801469916 _q((electronic)l(electronic)ctronic) |
||
043 |
_ae-uk--- _ae-gx--- |
||
050 | 0 | 0 |
_aD757 _b.C667 1995 |
049 | _aMAIN | ||
100 | 1 |
_aLegro, Jeffrey. _e1 |
|
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aCooperation under fire : _bAnglo-German restraint during World War II / _cJeffrey W. Legro. |
260 |
_aIthaca : _bCornell University Press, _c(c)1995. |
||
300 | _a1 online resource (xii, 255 pages) | ||
336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
||
337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
||
338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
||
347 |
_adata file _2rda |
||
490 | 1 | _aCornell studies in security affairs | |
504 | _a2 | ||
520 | 0 | _aWhy do nations cooperate even as they try to destroy each other? Jeffrey Legro explores this question in the context of World War II, the "total" war that in fact wasn't. During the war, combatant states attempted to sustain agreements limiting the use of three forms of combat considered barbarous - submarine attacks against civilian ships, strategic bombing of civilian targets, and chemical warfare. Looking at how these restraints worked or failed to work between such fierce enemies as Hitler's Third Reich and Churchill's Britain, Legro offers a new understanding of the dynamics of World War II and the sources of international cooperation. While traditional explanations of cooperation focus on the relations between actors, Cooperation under Fire examines what warring nations seek and why they seek it - the "preference formation" that undergirds international interaction. Scholars and statesmen debate whether it is the balance of power or the influence of international norms that most directly shapes foreign policy goals. Critically assessing both explanations, Legro argues that it was, rather, the organizational cultures of military bureaucracies - their beliefs and customs in waging war - that decided national priorities for limiting the use of force in World War II. Drawing on documents from Germany, Britain, the United States, and the former Soviet Union, Legro provides a compelling account of how military cultures molded state preferences and affected the success of cooperation. In its clear and cogent analysis, this book has significant implications for the theory and practice of international relations | |
530 |
_a2 _ub |
||
650 | 0 |
_aWorld War, 1939-1945 _xGermany. |
|
650 | 0 |
_aWorld War, 1939-1945 _xGreat Britain. |
|
650 | 0 |
_aCooperation _zGermany _xHistory _y20th century. |
|
650 | 0 |
_aCooperation _zGreat Britain _xHistory _y20th century. |
|
650 | 0 | _aInternational cooperation. | |
650 | 0 | _aLimited war. | |
655 | 1 | _aElectronic Books. | |
856 | 4 | 0 |
_uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=671507&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518 _zClick to access digital title | log in using your CIU ID number and my.ciu.edu password |
942 |
_cOB _D _eEB _hD _m1995 _QOL _R _x _8NFIC _2LOC |
||
994 |
_a92 _bNT |
||
999 |
_c100936 _d100936 |
||
902 |
_a1 _bCynthia Snell _c1 _dCynthia Snell |