Laws of nature /John W. Carroll.
Material type: TextSeries: Publication details: Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, (c)1994.Description: ix, 200 pages : illistrations ; 23 cmContent type:- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 9780521433341
- B105 .L397 1994
- COPYRIGHT NOT covered - Click this link to request copyright permission: https://lib.ciu.edu/copyright-request-form
Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Withdrawn | G. Allen Fleece Library WITHDRAWN | Non-fiction | B105.C319.L397 1994 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not for loan | 31923001670278 |
CHAPTER 1 - Centrality. -- 1.1. Reduction and the wholesome base -- 1.2.Skirting empiricist influences -- 1.3. Methodology -- 1.4. Three features of laws --
CHAPTER 2 - Humean analyses. -- 2.1. Naive regularity analyses -- 2.2. Induction, laws, and lawhood -- 2.3. Simplicity, strength, and best balance -- 2.4. Epistemology and metaphysics --
CHAPTER 3 - Humean supervenience -- 3.1. The mirror argument -- 3.2. Some conceptual geography: A look at chance -- 3.3. Vacuous laws and the varieties of supervenience -- 3.4. Ethics, mind, and the laws of nature --
CHAPTER 4 - A realist perspective -- 4.1. Lawless reality -- 4.2. Van Fraassen's antirealism -- 4.3. The argument for Humeanism --
CHAPTER 5 - Causation -- 5.1. The causal commitments of nomic dependencies -- 5.2. Lawfully equivalent epiphenomena -- 5.3. Probabilistic causation -- 5.4. Instantaneous causation -- 5.5. Causal commitments confirmed --
CHAPTER 6 - The limits of inquiry --
APPENDICES. -- Appendix A: Nomic platonism -- A.1. Universals, lawhood, and reduction -- A.2. Abstract particulars, lawhood, and reduction -- A.3. Ontology and the problem of laws -- Appendix B: Defending (South Carolina) -- B.1. Direct challenges -- B.2. An indirect challenge.
John W. Carroll undertakes a careful philosophical examination of laws of nature, causation, and other related topics. He argues that laws of nature are not susceptible to the sort of philosophical treatment preferred by empiricists. Indeed, he shows that empirically pure matters of fact need not even determine what the laws are. Similar, and even stronger, conclusions are drawn about causation. Replacing the traditional view of laws and causation as requiring some kind of foundational legitimacy, the author argues that these phenomena are inextricably intertwined with everything else. This distinctively clear and detailed discussion of what it is to be a law will be valuable to a broad swathe of philosophers in metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science.
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