Collective action under the Articles of Confederation /Keith L. Dougherty.
- Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, (c)2001.
- 1 online resource (xii, 211 pages) : illustrations.
Includes bibliographies and index.
The Mystery of State Contribution -- National Interests and State Sovereignty: Objectives of the Confederation -- Collective Action and the Provision of Public Goods -- The History of State Compliance -- State Contributions and Private Interests -- Reacting to Rebellion -- A New Constitution -- Conclusion -- Olson's Collective Action Game.
"Rather than focusing on why the states did not contribute to the national government under the Articles of Confederation, Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation asks why the states did contribute. Why did states pay large portions of their requisitions to the federal government when problems of collective action and the lack of governmental incentives imply they should not have? Using original data on Continental troop movements and federal debt holdings within each state, Dougherty shows that states contributed to the national government when doing so produced local gains. Such a theory stands in stark contrast to the standard argument that patriotism and civic duty encouraged state cooperation. Material incentives and local interests bound the union together and explained the push for constitutional reform more than the pursuit of mutual goals."--Jacket.
9781461949169
United States -- Articles of Confederation.
Federal government--History--United States--18th century. States' rights (American politics) Constitutional history--United States. State rights.