Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Courtedited by James R. Rogers, Roy B. Flemming, and Jon R. Bond.
Institutional games and the US Supreme Court Institutional games and the United States Supreme Court
- Charlottesville : University of Virginia Press, (c)2006.
- 1 online resource (xix, 335 pages) : illustrations.
- Constitutionalism and democracy .
Includes bibliographies and index.
Strategic games with Congress and the states -- Statutory battles and constitutional wars : Congress and the Supreme Court / Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators : accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference / Institutions and independence in models of judicial review / "John Marshall has made his decision" : implementation, transparency, and public support / Court-state interactions : national judicial power and the dormant commerce clause / Strategic games within the judicial hierarchy -- A court of appeals in a rational-choice model of Supreme Court decision making / Appeals mechanisms, litigant selection, and the structure of judicial hierarchies / Informative precedent and intrajudicial communications / Decision making by an agent with multiple principals : environmental policy in the U.S. courts of appeals / Afterword : studying courts formally / Appendix: a primer on game theory / Andrew D. Martin -- James R. Rogers -- Christopher Zorn -- Georg Vanberg -- Clifford J. Carrubba and James R. Rogers -- Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan -- Charles M. Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser -- Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson -- Stefanie A. Lindquist and Susan B. Haire -- Lawrence Baum -- James R. Rogers.
9780813934198
United States. Supreme Court. United States. Congress --Powers and duties.
Separation of powers--United States. Political questions and judicial power--United States.