Amazon cover image
Image from Amazon.com

Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Courtedited by James R. Rogers, Roy B. Flemming, and Jon R. Bond.

Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Publication details: Charlottesville : University of Virginia Press, (c)2006.Description: 1 online resource (xix, 335 pages) : illustrationsContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780813934198
Other title:
  • Institutional games and the US Supreme Court
  • Institutional games and the United States Supreme Court
Subject(s): Genre/Form: LOC classification:
  • KF8742 .I578 2006
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
Contents:
Statutory battles and constitutional wars : Congress and the Supreme Court / Andrew D. Martin -- Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators : accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference / James R. Rogers -- Institutions and independence in models of judicial review / Christopher Zorn -- "John Marshall has made his decision" : implementation, transparency, and public support / Georg Vanberg -- Court-state interactions : national judicial power and the dormant commerce clause / Clifford J. Carrubba and James R. Rogers -- Strategic games within the judicial hierarchy -- A court of appeals in a rational-choice model of Supreme Court decision making / Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan -- Appeals mechanisms, litigant selection, and the structure of judicial hierarchies / Charles M. Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser -- Informative precedent and intrajudicial communications / Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson -- Decision making by an agent with multiple principals : environmental policy in the U.S. courts of appeals / Stefanie A. Lindquist and Susan B. Haire -- Afterword : studying courts formally / Lawrence Baum -- Appendix: a primer on game theory / James R. Rogers.
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Star ratings
    Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Includes bibliographies and index.

Strategic games with Congress and the states -- Statutory battles and constitutional wars : Congress and the Supreme Court / Andrew D. Martin -- Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators : accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference / James R. Rogers -- Institutions and independence in models of judicial review / Christopher Zorn -- "John Marshall has made his decision" : implementation, transparency, and public support / Georg Vanberg -- Court-state interactions : national judicial power and the dormant commerce clause / Clifford J. Carrubba and James R. Rogers -- Strategic games within the judicial hierarchy -- A court of appeals in a rational-choice model of Supreme Court decision making / Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan -- Appeals mechanisms, litigant selection, and the structure of judicial hierarchies / Charles M. Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser -- Informative precedent and intrajudicial communications / Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson -- Decision making by an agent with multiple principals : environmental policy in the U.S. courts of appeals / Stefanie A. Lindquist and Susan B. Haire -- Afterword : studying courts formally / Lawrence Baum -- Appendix: a primer on game theory / James R. Rogers.

COPYRIGHT NOT covered - Click this link to request copyright permission:

https://lib.ciu.edu/copyright-request-form

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.