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The moral economy : why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens / Samuel Bowles.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Publication details: New Haven : Yale University Press 2016..Description: 1 online resource (288 pages) : illustrationsContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780300221084
Other title:
  • Why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens
Subject(s): Genre/Form: LOC classification:
  • K487 .M673 2016
  • HB72
  • HB1-130
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
Contents:
The problem with homo economicus -- A constitution for knaves -- Moral sentiments and material interests -- Incentives as information -- A liberal civic culture -- The legislator's dilemma -- A mandate for Aristotle's legislator.
Summary: Should the idea of economic man-the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus-determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding "no." Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may "crowd out" ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.
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Includes bibliographies and index.

Should the idea of economic man-the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus-determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding "no." Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may "crowd out" ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.

The problem with homo economicus -- A constitution for knaves -- Moral sentiments and material interests -- Incentives as information -- A liberal civic culture -- The legislator's dilemma -- A mandate for Aristotle's legislator.

Cover; Half Title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Content; Preface; I: The Problem with Homo economicus; II: A Constitution for Knaves; III: Moral Sentiments and Material Interests; IV: Incentives as Information; V: A Liberal Civic Culture; VI: The Legislator's Dilemma; VII: A Mandate for Aristotle's Legislator; Appendixes; Notes; Works Cited; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; U; V; W; Y; Z

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