Contrastive reasons /Justin Snedegar. (Record no. 77405)

MARC details
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fixed length control field 05373cam a2200433Ii 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field ocn975486958
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OCoLC
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240726104747.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 170314s2017 enk ob 001 0 eng d
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency NT
Language of cataloging eng
Description conventions rda
-- pn
Transcribing agency NT
Modifying agency NT
-- EBLCP
-- YDX
-- OCLCF
-- UKOUP
-- UBY
-- CSAIL
-- OH1
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9780191089039
Qualifying information
050 04 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number BF442
Item number .C668 2017
049 ## - LOCAL HOLDINGS (OCLC)
Holding library MAIN
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Snedegar, Justin,
Relator term Author
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Contrastive reasons /Justin Snedegar.
250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT
Edition statement First edition.
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Oxford, United Kingdom :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Oxford University Press,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. (c)2017.
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 1 online resource (xi, 149 pages)
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Content type term text
Content type code txt
Source rdacontent
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Media type term computer
Media type code c
Source rdamedia
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Carrier type term online resource
Carrier type code cr
Source rdacarrier
347 ## - DIGITAL FILE CHARACTERISTICS
File type data file
Source rda
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE
Bibliography, etc. note Includes bibliographies and index.
520 0# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not been discussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best account of our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates in both epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention.
505 00 - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note Cover; Contrastive Reasons; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Preface; 1: Contrastivism and Reasons; 1.1 Reasons and Contrastivism; 1.1.1 Reasons; 1.1.2 Contrastivism; 1.2 Reasons and the Contrastivist Program; 1.2.1 Reasons and justification; 1.2.2 Reasons and 'ought'; 1.2.3 Reasons and explanation; 1.3 The Plan; 2: Reason Claims; 2.1 A Simple Argument; 2.2 A Stronger Argument; 2.2.1 The argument; 2.2.2 Response: denying exclusivity; 2.3 Contrastivism; 2.3.1 A contrastive account of reason claims; 2.3.2 A contrastive solution; 2.4 Other 'Rather than' Ascriptions
505 00 - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 2.5 Negative Reason Existentials2.5.1 The puzzle; 2.5.2 The pragmatic solution; 2.5.3 A contrastivist solution; 2.6 Looking Forward; 3: Favoring; 3.1 Why Resist Contrastivism?; 3.2 Shallow Contrastivism; 3.2.1 A traditional theory of favoring; 3.2.2 A contrastive account of reason claims; 3.2.3 Shallow contrastivism and exclusivity; 3.3 Favoring; 3.3.1 Against non-contrastive favoring; 3.4 Contrastive Reasons and Favoring; 3.4.1 Contrastivism; 3.4.2 A problem; 3.4.3 Reasons and ought; 3.5 Looking Forward; 4: Promotion; 4.1 The Need for Constraints; 4.1.1 Intransitivity
505 00 - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 4.1.2 Reasons for and subsets4.1.3 Reasons against and supersets; 4.1.4 Entailment relations and deliberation; 4.2 Promotion; 4.2.1 Promotion in the theory of reasons; 4.2.2 Doing nothing; 4.2.3 Not A-ing; 4.2.4 Contrastive promotion; 4.2.5 Motivating resolution sensitivity; 4.3 Contrastive Reasons and Promotion; 4.4 Contrastive Reasons as Better Reasons?; 4.5 Providing the Constraints; 4.5.1 Transitivity; 4.5.2 Non-exhaustivity; 4.5.3 Resolution sensitivity; 4.5.4 Other entailments: Unions and intersections; 4.6 Non-Promotional Reasons; 4.7 Where we Are; 5: Intransitivity
505 00 - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 5.1 Transitivity and Reasons5.2 Intransitivity; 5.2.1 The Repugnant Conclusion; 5.2.2 Resisting the first step; 5.2.3 The Mere Addition Paradox; 5.3 Intransitivity and Contrastivism; 5.3.1 Two kinds of intransitivity; 5.4 Contrast-Sensitive Importance; 5.4.1 Strength of reasons and importance of objectives; 5.4.2 Contrast-sensitive importance; 5.4.3 Contrastivism about reasons and importance; 5.5 Remaining Questions; 5.5.1 What should I do?; 5.5.2 Why so uncommon?; 5.6 Conclusion; 6: Withholding; 6.1 Withholding Belief and Contrastive Reasons; 6.1.1 Contrastive epistemic reasons
505 00 - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 6.1.2 A contrastive account of rational withholding6.1.3 A non-contrastive account; 6.1.4 Ties; 6.1.5 A contrastivist explanation; 6.1.6 Reasons not to withhold belief?; 6.2 Withholding Intention; 6.2.1 A unified account?; 6.2.2 Contrastive practical reasons; 6.2.3 A contrastive account of rational withholding of intention; 6.2.4 A unified account; 6.3 Wrap Up; References; Index
530 ## - COPYRIGHT INFORMATION:
COPYRIGHT INFORMATION COPYRIGHT NOT covered - Click this link to request copyright permission:
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="b">b</a>
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Reasoning.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Contrast (Philosophy)
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Normativity (Ethics)
655 #1 - INDEX TERM--GENRE/FORM
Genre/form data or focus term Electronic Books.
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
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942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Online Book (LOGIN USING YOUR MY CIU LOGIN AND PASSWORD)
DONATED BY:
VENDOR EBSCO
Classification part BF
PUBLICATION YEAR 2017
LOCATION ONLINE
REQUESTED BY:
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Source of classification or shelving scheme
994 ## -
-- 92
-- NT
902 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT B, LDB (RLIN)
a 1
b Cynthia Snell
c 1
d Cynthia Snell
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Damaged status Not for loan Collection Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Source of acquisition Total Checkouts Full call number Barcode Date last seen Uniform Resource Identifier Price effective from Koha item type
        Non-fiction G. Allen Fleece Library G. Allen Fleece Library ONLINE 07/07/2023 EBSCO   BF442 ocn975486958 07/07/2023 httpss://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1484901&site=eds-live&custid=s3260518 07/07/2023 Online Book (LOGIN USING YOUR MY CIU LOGIN AND PASSWORD)