MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
14190cam a2200505 i 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
|---|
| control field |
ocm44627294 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
|---|
| control field |
OCoLC |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
|---|
| control field |
20240726104025.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
000626r20001957mau b 000 0 eng |
| 010 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONTROL NUMBER |
|---|
| LC control number |
00057521 |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
|---|
| International Standard Book Number |
9780674003996 |
| 029 1# - OTHER SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER (OCLC) |
|---|
| OCLC library identifier |
AU@ |
| System control number |
000021665548 |
| 029 1# - OTHER SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER (OCLC) |
|---|
| OCLC library identifier |
DEBBG |
| System control number |
BV035094543 |
| 029 1# - OTHER SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER (OCLC) |
|---|
| OCLC library identifier |
DEBSZ |
| System control number |
25820463X |
| 029 1# - OTHER SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER (OCLC) |
|---|
| OCLC library identifier |
HEBIS |
| System control number |
094190828 |
| 029 1# - OTHER SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER (OCLC) |
|---|
| OCLC library identifier |
NLGGC |
| System control number |
406660247 |
| 029 1# - OTHER SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER (OCLC) |
|---|
| OCLC library identifier |
NZ1 |
| System control number |
16299153 |
| 029 1# - OTHER SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER (OCLC) |
|---|
| OCLC library identifier |
UKBOR |
| System control number |
050971585 |
| 029 1# - OTHER SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER (OCLC) |
|---|
| OCLC library identifier |
UNITY |
| System control number |
050971585 |
| 029 1# - OTHER SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER (OCLC) |
|---|
| OCLC library identifier |
YDXCP |
| System control number |
1681478 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
|---|
| Original cataloging agency |
DLC |
| Language of cataloging |
eng |
| Description conventions |
rda |
| Transcribing agency |
DLC |
| Modifying agency |
BAKER |
| -- |
BTCTA |
| -- |
YDXCP |
| -- |
LMR |
| -- |
LVB |
| -- |
OCLCG |
| -- |
QE2 |
| -- |
UBC |
| -- |
HEBIS |
| -- |
DEBBG |
| -- |
OCLCQ |
| -- |
BDX |
| -- |
OCLCF |
| -- |
OCLCQ |
| -- |
OCLCO |
| -- |
OCLCQ |
| -- |
GRG |
| -- |
OCLCQ |
| -- |
OCLCO |
| -- |
T9K |
| -- |
KFH |
| -- |
OCLCQ |
| -- |
OCLCO |
| -- |
CNGUL |
| -- |
OCLCO |
| 049 ## - LOCAL HOLDINGS (OCLC) |
|---|
| Holding library |
SBI |
| 050 04 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
BC199 |
| Item number |
.I584 2000 |
| 050 04 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
BC199 |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Anscombe, G. E. M. |
| Fuller form of name |
(Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret), |
| Relator term |
Author |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Intention /by G.E.M. Anscombe. |
| 250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT |
|---|
| Edition statement |
second edition. |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. |
Cambridge, Massachusetts : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. |
Harvard University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
(c)2000. |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
ix, 94 pages ; |
| Dimensions |
23 cm |
| 336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
|---|
| Content type term |
text |
| Content type code |
txt |
| Source |
rdacontent |
| 337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
|---|
| Media type term |
unmediated |
| Media type code |
n |
| Source |
rdamedia |
| 338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
|---|
| Carrier type term |
volume |
| Carrier type code |
nc |
| Source |
rdacarrier |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE |
|---|
| General note |
Originally published: Oxford : Blackwell, 1957. |
| 504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE |
|---|
| Bibliography, etc. note |
Includes bibliographical references. |
| 505 00 - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
|---|
| Title |
The subject introduced under three heads: expression of inteation for the future, international action, and intention in acting, pages1 -- |
| -- |
Intuitive understanding of the difference between, prediction' and 'expression of intention' rejected as a foundation for a philosophical account of espressions of intention. Prediction defined so as to comprise orders and expressions of intention as well as estimates of the future, The falsity of expressions of intention in the simple future tense (a) as lying and (b) as falsity because the intention is not carried out, pages1 -- |
| -- |
Usefulness of considering the verbal expression of intention for the future in order to avoid various dead ends. Uselessness of an introspective explanation of intention. Expressions of intentions distinguished from estimates of the future by the justification, if any, given for them, pages5 -- |
| -- |
Are there any statements of the form 'A intends X' which can be made with fair certainty? Deseriptions of a man's actions of ten deseriptions truly substitutable for c X' in 'A intends X'. Reasons why we suppose a man the sole authority on his own intentions, pages7 -- |
| -- |
Intentional actions defined as those to which a certain sense of the question 'Why? ' is given application. Difficulty of defining the relevant sense and danger of moving in a circle in our explanations of ' reason for acting' and 'action'. 'I knocked the cup off the table because i was startled 'gives an answer to a question 'Why? ' about something done, pages9 -- |
| -- |
The question 'Why?' is refused application by the answer 'I did not know i was doing that'. The same action can have many descriptions, in some of which the agent knows it and in some not, pages11 -- |
| -- |
The question also refused application when the action was involuntary; but this notion cannot be introduced without treating as solved the very kind of problem we are discussing. Difficulties of the notion 'involuntary ', pages12 -- |
| -- |
'Non-observational knowledge' introduced as e.g. the knowledge one has of some of one's own movements. There is also nonobservational knowledge of the causation of a movement, as when i say why i gave a start. We can define one class of involuntary movements without begging any questions, as the class of movements known without observation, but where there is no room for nonobservational knowledge of causality: e.g. the muscular spasm one sometimes has in dropping off to sleep, pages13 -- |
| -- |
In one sense of 'Why? ' the answer mentions evidence; but an answer to a question 'Why?' about an action, which does not mention evidence, does not there fore necessarily give a reason for acting. The cases where it was difficult to distinguish a cause from a reason turn out to be ones where there is non-observational knowledge of the causation, pages15 -- |
| -- |
This kind of causation labelled 'mental causality '. Mental causes should be distinguished from motives of actions and objects of feelings, pages16. |
| 505 00 - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
|---|
| Title |
And also from intentions with which a person acts, even though these may be expressed in the form 'i wanted . . .' Mental causality is not important in itself, but it is important to make these distinctions, pages17 -- |
| -- |
Motives have been sharply distinguished from irtentions by philosophers, and deseribed as causes. Popularly motive and intention are not so distinct; but 'motive' is a wider notion than "intention'. A motive is not a cause at all, pages18 -- |
| -- |
Among motives that are not intentions for the future we can distinguish between backward-Iooking motives like reveage (i killed him because he killed my brother)and motive-in-general (He did it out of friendship). Motive-in-general can also be called ' interpretative' motive, pages20 -- |
| -- |
What distinguishes backward-looking motives from mental causes? The notions of good and harm are involved in them, pages21 -- |
| -- |
In some cases the distinction between a mental cause and a reason is not sharp -- |
| -- |
E.g. 'I put it down because he told me to', pages23 -- |
| -- |
Summary of results reached so far, pages24 -- |
| -- |
The question 'Why?' is not refused application when the answer is e.g. 'For no particular resson' or 'I don't know why I did it'. Consideration of the larter answer, pages25 -- |
| -- |
The fact that' For no particular reason 'is a possible answer to the question 'Why?' about an action does not shew that this answer always makes sense. But when we speak of it as not making sense, we mean that we cannot understand the man who says it, rather than that 'a form of words is excluded from the language'. The question 'Why?' identified as one expecting an answer in the range we have described, which range we use to define the class of intentional actions, pages26 -- |
| -- |
' We do not mention any extra feature attaching to an action at the time it is done by calling it intentional. Proof of this by supposing there is such a feature, pages28 -- |
| -- |
Discussion whether intentional actions could still have the characteristic of being intentional although there were no such thing as expression of intention for the future, or further intention with which one acts. There would be no such thing as our question 'Why?' or intentional action if the only answer were: 'For no particular reason', pages30 -- |
| -- |
Criticism of the Aristotelian proof of a final end for a man's actions. Still, we ean now see that some chains of reasons for acting must oecur if there is such a thing as intentional action at all, pages33 -- |
| -- |
Discussion of intention wilh which, when this mentions something future. In order for it to be possible to say that an agent does P in order that Q, he must treat an aeknowledgement of 'But if P, Q won't happen' as incompatible with his having that intention in acting, pages34 -- |
| -- |
Is there any deseription whieh is the deseription of an intentioral action when intentional action occurs? An example is invented in which to examine the question: a man who moves his arm in pumping water to replenish a house water-supply to poison the inhabitants and is also doing other things with the pump handie at the same time. Any true deseriptions of what he is doing which satisfy our criteria, are descriptions of intentional actions. Are there as many actions and as many intentions as there are such deseriptions?, pages37 -- |
| -- |
Difficulties. If' he is poisoning the inhabitants ' is one of these deseriptions, when does he do this? How is moving his arn up and down an act of poisoning the inhabitants?, pages41 -- |
| -- |
Supposing the man to know the water will poison the inhabitants, but to say' i didn't care about that, i was only doing my job of pumping " this answer does not fall within the range of answers to ' Why? ' by which we have defined intentional action. Can one determine one's intertions just by what one says theyare? The interest of a man's .Intenrions, apart from what he actually did, pages41 -- |
| -- |
nswer to the questions of 23. The A-D order: Le. the order of deseriptions of an aetion as intentional, such that each term of the series can be said to be an intention in the action as deseribed by the previous term, and the last term an intention of the action as deseribed by the first or any intermediate term, pages45 -- |
| -- |
Is there ever any place for an irterior act of intention, which really deterrnines what Is or Is not going on under the title ' such-and-such a kind of action'?, pages47 -- |
| -- |
Further enquiry into nor-observational knowledge. Knowledge of one's own intentional actions=-I can say what I am doing without looking to see, pages49 -- |
| -- |
But must there not be two objects of knowledge-what I am 'doing', Le. my intentior, and what is actually taking place, which can only be given by observation? Philosophieal views on will and intention w hich have arisen from this problem, pages51. |
| 505 00 - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
|---|
| Title |
An example to prove that it Is wrong to try and push the real intertion, or act of will, back to something initiating the movements that then take place, pages53 -- |
| -- |
Attempt at solution by comparing the facts which may falsify a statement of intentional action to the facts which may make an order fall to the ground. Inade- quacy of this solution, pages54 -- |
| -- |
Example of man with a shopping list: the relation of this list to what he buys, and of what he buys to a list made by a detective following him. The character of a discrepancy between the list and what is bought in the two cases. Is there such a thing as ' practieal knowledge' in the sense of anciert and medieval philosophy?, pages56 -- |
| -- |
This notion can only be understood by first under- standing what Aristotle called "practical reasoning'. The practical syllogism Is not a form of demonstration of what i ought to do. It is a different kind of reason- ing from that of the proof syllogism, but this has been misunderstood in modem times, pages57 -- |
| -- |
Practical syllogisms are not confined to ones that look paralle! to proof syllogisms. The starting point for a piece of practical reasoning is something wanted, and the first premise mentions something wanted, pages62 -- |
| -- |
Occurrence of evaluative terms in the first premise of practical syliogisms given by Aristotle. Not every statement of a reason for acting shews practical reasoning. 'I want' does not rightly occur in the premises, but the first premise must mention something wanted, pages63 -- |
| -- |
In the relevant sense of' wanting', X ' in 'A wants X' does not range over all describable objects or states of affairs. Volition and sense-knowledge cannot be deseribed independently of one arother. Problem of wanting a wife, and generaliy of wanting what the agent does not even suppose to exist yet, pages67 -- |
| -- |
If a man wants sornething, he can always be asked what for, or in what aspect it is desirable; until he gives a desirability-charactedsation, pages70 -- |
| -- |
The question 'What for?' cannot significantly be asked in a continuation of the series of such questions, once a desirability-characterisation has been reached. The point illustrated by an example: 'It befits a Nazi to spend his last hour exterminating Jews'. This does not mean that the praetical reasoning cannot be assailed so long as it is not falladous, pages71 -- |
| -- |
The fact that a desirability-characterisation is required does not shew that any is compulsive in relation to wanting. Bonum est multiplex, pages74 -- |
| -- |
Comparison of the problem of the relation of ' wanting, to' good 'with that of the relation of' judging, to 'true', pages76 -- |
| -- |
The mark of practical reasoning is that the thing wanted is at a distance from the particular action, pages78 -- |
| -- |
The 'absurdity' of setting praetical reasonings out in full. The point is to deseribe not what (psychologically) goes on, but an order; the same order as i deseribed in discussing what 'the intentional action' was, pages79 -- |
| -- |
Centrast between 'the stove is burning' and' the man is paying his gas bill': enormous apparent complexity of' doing, in the latter case, pages80 -- |
| -- |
Consideration of 'If i do this, this will happen, if that, that' followed by action: cases in which this is, and in which it is not' practical reasoning', pages80 -- |
| -- |
Practical knowledge considered as the knowledge of what is done in the man who directs a project without seeing it. Problem: how is this knowledge, if his orders do not get carried out?, pages82 -- |
| -- |
The deseription of something as e.g. building a house or writing on the blackboard employs the concept of human action, which we have seen to be defined by means of our question 'Why?', pages83 -- |
| -- |
The term 'intentional' relates to a form of deseription of events. Intention in animals, pages84 -- |
| -- |
Many descriptions of events effected by humans are formally deseriptions of executed intentions. Elucidation of the notion of practical knowledge, pages87 -- |
| -- |
Account of ' voluntary ' action, pages89 -- |
| -- |
Return to expression of irtention for the future. What has been said about intention in present action also applies to future intention. A prediction is an expression of intention when our question 'Why?' applies to it, pages90 -- |
| -- |
Consideration of 'i just want to, that's all' in regard to an expression of Intention for the future, pages90 -- |
| -- |
'I am not going to-' as an expression of intention, and 'I am going to-' as an expression of belief. Cases where they might occur together, pages91. |
| 520 1# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
"Intention is one of the masterworks of twentieth-century philosophy in English. First published in 1957, it has acquired the state of a modern philophical classic. The book attempts to show to detail that the natural and widely accepted picture of what we mean by an intention gives rise to insoluble problems and must be abandoned. This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance."--Jacket. |
| 530 ## - COPYRIGHT INFORMATION: |
|---|
| COPYRIGHT INFORMATION |
COPYRIGHT NOT covered - Click this link to request copyright permission: |
| 650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Intention (Logic) |
| 650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Intention (Logique) |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha item type |
Circulating Book (checkout times vary with patron status) |
| Classification part |
BC |
| PUBLICATION YEAR |
2000 |
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
| REPLACEMENT COST (GET FROM AMAZON) |
73.48 |
| 948 ## - LOCAL PROCESSING INFORMATION (OCLC); SERIES PART DESIGNATOR (RLIN) |
|---|
| h (OCLC) |
HELD BY SBI - 248 OTHER HOLDINGS |
| 902 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT B, LDB (RLIN) |
|---|
| a |
1 |
| b |
Cynthia Snell |
| c |
1 |
| d |
Cynthia Snell |