Hitler's soldiers : the German army in the Third Reich / Ben H. Shepherd.

By:

Shepherd, Ben (Ben H.) [Author]

Material type: Text

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9780300219524

Subject(s):

Genre/Form:

Electronic Books.

LOC classification:

D757 .H585 2016

Online resources:

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Available additional physical forms:

Contents:

Road to War, 1936-39 -- Poland, 1939-40 -- "Sitzkrieg," 1939-40 -- The Greatest Victory, 1940 -- Occupying the West, 1940-41 -- Planning Operation Barbarossa, 1940-41 -- Barbarossa Unleashed, 1941 -- Barbarossa Undone, 1941 -- Resistance and Reaction, 1941 : Western Europe and the Balkans -- Winter Crisis, 1941-42 -- The Desert War, 1941-42 -- Southern Russia and Stalingrad, 1942-43 -- Faces of Occupation, 1942-43 : The Soviet Union -- Faces of Occupation, 1942-43 : Western Europe and the Balkans -- The Initiative Lost, 1943 -- Takeover in Southern Europe, 1943-44 -- The Eastern Front, 1943-44 : The Ostheer Retreats -- The Eastern Front, 1943-44 : The Frontsoldat Endures -- Italy, 1943-44 -- Fortress Europe Breached, 1943-44 -- The Greatest Defeat, 1944 -- The Army "Recovers," 1944-45 -- The Army Self-Destructs, 1945.

Scope and content: "For decades after 1945, it was generally believed that the German army, professional and morally decent, had largely stood apart from the SS, Gestapo, and other corps of the Nazi machine. Ben Shepherd draws on a wealth of primary sources and recent scholarship to convey a much darker, more complex picture. For the first time, the German army is examined throughout the Second World War, across all combat theaters and occupied regions, and from multiple perspectives: its battle performance, social composition, relationship with the Nazi state, and involvement in war crimes and military occupation. This was a true people's army, drawn from across German society and reflecting that society as it existed under the Nazis. Without the army and its conquests abroad, Shepherd explains, the Nazi regime could not have perpetrated its crimes against Jews, prisoners of war, and civilians in occupied countries. The author examines how the army was complicit in these crimes and why some soldiers, units, and higher commands were more complicit than others. Shepherd also reveals the reasons for the army's early battlefield successes and its mounting defeats up to 1945, the latter due not only to Allied superiority and Hitler's mismanagement as commander-in-chief, but also to the failings--moral, political, economic, strategic, and operational--of the army's own leadership"--

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Collection	Call number	URL	Status	Date due	Barcode
Online Book (LOGIN USING YOUR MY CIU LOGIN AND PASSWORD)	G. Allen Fleece Library ONLINE	Non-fiction	D757.1 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Link to resource	Available		ocn948286427

"For decades after 1945, it was generally believed that the German army, professional and morally decent, had largely stood apart from the SS, Gestapo, and other corps of the Nazi machine. Ben Shepherd draws on a wealth of primary sources and recent scholarship to convey a much darker, more complex picture. For the first time, the German army is examined throughout the Second World War, across all combat theaters and occupied regions, and from multiple perspectives: its battle performance, social composition, relationship with the Nazi state, and involvement in war crimes and military occupation. This was a true people's army, drawn from across German society and reflecting that society as it existed under the Nazis. Without the army and its conquests abroad, Shepherd explains, the Nazi regime could not have perpetrated its crimes against Jews, prisoners of war, and civilians in occupied countries. The author examines how the army was complicit in these crimes and why some soldiers, units, and higher commands were more complicit than others. Shepherd also reveals the reasons for the army's early battlefield successes and its mounting defeats up to 1945, the latter due not only to Allied superiority and Hitler's mismanagement as commander-in-chief, but also to the failings--moral, political, economic, strategic, and operational--of the army's own leadership"--

Includes bibliographical references.

The Army in the New Reich, 1933-36 -- Road to War, 1936-39 -- Poland, 1939-40 -- "Sitzkrieg," 1939-40 -- The Greatest Victory, 1940 -- Occupying the West, 1940-41 -- Planning Operation Barbarossa, 1940-41 -- Barbarossa Unleashed, 1941 -- Barbarossa Undone, 1941 -- Resistance and Reaction, 1941 : Western Europe and the Balkans -- Winter Crisis, 1941-42 -- The Desert War, 1941-42 -- Southern Russia and Stalingrad, 1942-43 -- Faces of Occupation, 1942-43 : The Soviet Union -- Faces of Occupation, 1942-43 : Western Europe and the Balkans -- The Initiative Lost, 1943 -- Takeover in Southern Europe, 1943-44 -- The Eastern Front, 1943-44 : The Ostheer Retreats -- The Eastern Front, 1943-44 : The Frontsoldat Endures -- Italy, 1943-44 -- Fortress Europe Breached, 1943-44 -- The Greatest Defeat, 1944 -- The Army "Recovers," 1944-45 -- The Army Self-Destructs, 1945.

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